

AVERROES & ENLIGHTENMENT
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION



PROCEEDINGS
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

ONE CIVILISATION, MANY CULTURES

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Editors
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We acknowledge, with utmost gratitude, the long-time cooperation of Goethe Institute with us. This cooperation started in 1988 and was kept up by a long line of successive Directors. It started on a national scale and developed internationally from 1990 – 94 with the Afro-Asian philosophy Association (AAPA), then with the Averroes & Enlightenment International Association (AE) since 1994 until now.

Due to the intellectual and financial support of Goethe Institute, the publication of this conference proceedings was possible. The present publication, along with all previous ones, is the fruit of our mutual cooperation. It is also a sign of a very successful dialogue of cultures.

The Editors



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Preface

The theme of the conference implies a major controversial issue, that is, the concepts of civilization and culture, whether they are synonymous or two historically interrelated entities, whether the relation between the two concepts is one of separation, and ultimately leading to conflicts and wars, or rather one of integration, interdependence, and ultimately unity and peace of civilization.

The aim of the conference was to tackle these two controversial issues in the light of the recently emerging phenomenon, which was also of a highly controversial nature, that is, globalization. Consequently, we tackled the issue of the conflict or unity of civilization and cultures in the light of globalization, both from the negative and positive aspects, particularly in the light of the escalation of national, ethnic and religious fundamentalist conflicts.

Due to the essentially controversial nature of the conference theme, a number of controversial topics were tackled by the speakers who represented different perspectives and controversial opinions which guided the discussion that followed. The speakers, commentators, and audience were selected

from a variety of fields: philosophy, politics, economics, sociology, arts, literature, theatre, cinema, mass-media, and business.

The Editors

Opening Address

by

Ali Shalakani

Sponsor of the Conference

Dear Colleagues,

It gives me great pleasure to be among such a gathering of eminent and select group of world thinkers who have responded to the invitation of the **International Association of Averroes and Enlightenment**.

You are here to tackle one of the most crucial issues of the upcoming century, and which could be formulated in the following question:

Are we on the way to one human civilization, that is, cross-fertilized by diverse cultures, or are we on the way to a clash between a multiplicity of civilizations and cultures, each claiming the sole right to rescue humanity from misery and unhappiness?

I believe that the international community of scholars and researchers is looking forward to reading your papers and discussions which will be inspiring for them in discovering the scientific method that is most appropriate in confronting and tackling the issue of this conference.

When I met with the representative of your Association who asked me to be its sponsor, I agreed

without hesitation because it is my conviction that your Association is performing an unprecedented role in establishing a cultural bridge between world cultures, particularly, the Arab culture and the West. I have also been following closely the activities of your Association, the three international conferences it has held since **1994**, in addition to the publication of the conference proceedings and the annual Journal titled: "**Averroes Today**".

Finally, I wish you a four-day creative and fruitful deliberation and a pleasant stay in Cairo.

Opening Address

Mourad Wahba

At the beginning of my talk, I would like to welcome our eminent guests who have shown great enthusiasm to participate in this conference, and I hope that this conference will be, for those who are participating with us for the first time, the beginning of a long and fruitful cooperation.

The theme of this conference "One Civilisation, Many Cultures" is a symbol of a conference par excellence. This is due to the Latin origin of the term "conference", which is "conferentia" meaning confrontation. The confrontation in this conference is between unity and diversity which has been provoked in the field of theology particularly around the concept of the creation of the world. The confrontation revolved round the major question: how can the One emanate the many? From then on the controversy began between the emanation theory and the creationist theory. And here we shift the controversy from theology to anthropology. Within this context, two books succeeded in arousing an international ferocious dialogue. These books are The End of History by Francis Faukuyama and The Clash of Civlisations by Samuel Huntington. This ferocity was due to a crisis of cultural identities in 1989 after the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of global politics. From these phenomena we, in **Averroes and Enlightenment International Association**, tried to

pave the way for finding a new path towards a new method of thinking that could help in resolving the above mentioned crisis or, at least, could help in finding a new formula. Within this context, our association organised up till now three international conferences under the following titles: **Averroes and Enlightenment** in **1994**; **Creativity and Pax Mundi** in **1996**; and **Terrorism and Teaching Philosophy** in **1998**. And today in the year 2000, the theme of our fourth conference is "One Civilisation, Many Cultures." And it was up to our eminent participants to respond to the problematics embedded in the theme of this conference.

Before ending my talk, I would like to thank our sponsors: first the Minister of Culture, FarouK Hosni, who has backed and supported our association since its inception by sponsoring our international conferences both financially and morally.

Deep heartfelt thanks are due to our long-time partner, the Goethe Institute represented today by its director Dr. Pirrung, and the director of Cultural Programs Dr. Kunzel. Our collaboration with Geothe Institute goes far back to 1989 when it strongly supported all our activities at the **Afro-Asian Philosophy Association** which is the mother association of **Averroes and Enlightenment**. Without Goethe's partnership, morally, intellectually and, of course, financially, it would have been difficult to carry on.

Special thanks go to our Egyptian sponsor, the dear friend and renown international law specialist, Mr. Ali Shalakany, for his great enthusiasm for our association, and his strong and prompt acceptance of our proposal to be the sponsor of our association.

Mr. Shalakany is a great model for the enlightened and committed intellectual who works for the promotion of human values and ideals, foremost among which are peace and global understanding.

Once more, I would like to welcome you all, and wish you a pleasant stay in Cairo and productive and interesting conference.

Thank you



Epistemology of Globalisation

Mourad Wahba

Before proceeding to the main current of this paper, three terms require clarification. Two appear in the title and the third is a descendent of the second. These are: epistemology, globalization and civilization. Before proceeding to that, a bit more background is needed.

Epistemology, according to its derivation from the Greek language, means theory of knowledge (episteme means knowledge, and logos means theory).

The problem of truth is the culmination of the epistemological enquiry. The traditional theories of truth are: 1) The correspondence theory which conceives truth as a relation between an idea or a proposition and its object; 2) The coherence theory which adopts, as the criterion of truth, the logical consistency of a proposition with a wider system of propositions; 3) The pragmatic theory which tries to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.

The first theory presupposes that we know things apart from our reason, then compare between the original and its copy neglecting the impact of reason on knowing the things.



The second means that truth is inside our reason and can be known only through its logical implication according to certain rules. But these laws differ from one philosopher to another. Aristotle's logic depends on the principle of non-contradiction, whereas Hegel's logic rotates round the principle of contradiction.

As for the third, it negates the absolute truth and advocates multiple truths, which, in this case, are subjective and not objective, whereas truth is, by its nature, one and not many. This means that truth is either absolute or none. And the absolute truth is out of reach because human beings, being relative, cannot grasp the absolute truth. Accordingly, reason has no relation with knowing the truth. So, we eliminate truth, but this elimination does not mean the exclusion of knowledge.

Now, the question is:

What is meant by knowledge?

This question can be answered through the relation between reason and knowledge.

But what is reason?

Reason is in-the-world and not out of the world. Thus, the unity between reason and the world is from the beginning. But this unity implies opposition as long as reason is considered as a part of a whole which is the world. But this opposition means that the

relation between reason and the world is dialectical in the sense that reason transcends the world and this transcendence implies two processes: interpreting the world for the sake of transforming it. Thus, reason could be defined as the faculty of practico-transcendental interpretation. And the knowledge which comes out of this kind of reason is unified and not fragmented. Thus, unity of knowledge is embedded in reason. And this unity has been practiced, unconsciously from the 18th century when the notion of civilization as singular emerged and with it the unity of knowledge.

But in Germany in the 19th century the philosophers distinguished between civilization and culture as a value system. I am for this distinction for the following reasons:

The origin of civilization reveals this essential characteristic when the primitive man created the technique of agriculture as a prelude for establishing human civilization because this technique led to transforming man's relation to nature from being horizontal, during the hunting age, into being vertical. But as long as scientific thinking embedded in this technique was limited, mythos was the central organizing principle and, accordingly, it gained an absolute authority in matters of science as well as in those of morals. On the other hand, history of civilization shows us how human reason has emerged to emancipate man from the mythology of the

agricultural civilization. The Greeks were the first to transform this mythos into logos. But mythos did not yield. It was rapped into what might be called cultural taboos which became the basis of cultural identities.

These taboos are untouchable, uncriticized and rooted in the collective consciousness. They differ from one culture to another according to the degree of the development of logos within these cultures. As an example, the Religious Reformation in the continent of Europe, emancipated reason from the religious authority that hindered reason from interpreting the Bible, that is, from not surpassing the literal meaning of the sacred text. Then Enlightenment emerged to emancipate reason from any authority except reason itself. In the meantime, the other continents left their cultural taboos without being criticized. Therefore, a civilization gap separated Europe from the rest.

By the 20th century the scientific - technological revolution emerged in that continent and culminated in what is termed now as globalization. This term is derived from the Latin term 'globus' which means the Planet Earth, and hence globalization means the process of handling the Earth as one unit.

Towards a Global Identity

Mona Abousenna (Egypt)

In chapter 27 entitled "Of Identity and Diversity," John Locke writes in <u>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</u> that "personal identity consists in what a person stands for." He then goes on to elaborate that the person is "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that <u>consciousness</u> which is inseparable from thinking, and, Locke adds, is essential to it." (p. 211) In this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the awareness of a rational being;" this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought.

The question then is:

What is the nature of that consciousness which makes personal identity?

In order to find an adequate answer to the above question, I think it would be pertinent to make the following statement at the outset, namely, that what applies to personal identity as defined by Locke, applies also to cultural identity. This assumption is substantiated by the fact that the issue of identity is central to cultural studies in so far as these studies examine the contexts within which and through which both individuals and groups perceive, construct and defend their identity or self-understanding.

Cultural studies on the whole approach the issue of identity in an orthodox way, by which he means that the self is considered something autonomous and independent of all external influences. (p.) the archetype of this whole approach is Spengler's notion of closed culture circles: Decline of the West. This approach holds that cultural identity is a response or reaction to an external threat because it is different. Orthodox European philosophy heralded by Descartes who assumed that the self, ego or subject, exists as an autonomous source of meaning. Descartes' 'thinking subject' is the only undoubtful fact of existence. The notion of the autonomous cultural identity continuing throughout the individual's life dominated also European political thought.

The term "cultural identity" flourished during the Cold War era, designating individual and collective consciousness which accompanies a certain religion of a certain people.

In this sense, cultural identity, particularly within Third World countries, were strengthened and supported by the two warring ideological camps, the West and the Soviet Union, and were used as a means to attaining power during the Cold War.

However, the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1980s coincided with the emergence of What Peter Berger calls the "Post industrial Society", or more precisely the "Knowledge Society" according to the term invented by Peter Drucker. This new society is

the outcome of the scientific-technological revolution which culminated as the information and communication revolution represented by computer technology and the Internet. This revolution gave rise to the phenomenon of globalization.

The question now is:

> What is the nature of identity within the knowledge society which is the outcome of globalization?

In order to answer this question, one should be aware of a basic undergoing problematic. This problematic is outlined by S. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations, which is a landmark of the end of the 20th and beginning of 21st centuries, S. Huntington writes about what he calls "the Politics of Identity" which is the result of global politics: "spurred by modernization, global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines. Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. Peoples and countries with different cultures are coming apart. Alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization. Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilizational. Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics." (p. 27) Huntington maintains that "in the new world cultural identity is the central factor

shaping a country's associations and antagonisms." (p. 27) this situation came to a head in the last decade of the 20th c., that is, the 1990s which, according to Huntington, witnessed "the eruption of a global identity crisis." (ibid.)

Non-Western societies are increasingly asserting their own cultural values and rejecting those which they believe are imposed on them by the West. The danger of this new world order resides in the fact that local politics is the politics of ethnicity, (and) global politics is the politics of civilizations, or, more precisely the politics of the clash of civilizations, as Huntington puts it. (p. 28)

From the foregoing arguments crystallizes one major problematic which consists in the contradiction between the technologically advanced global age and the culturally lagging behind global politics.

The question then is : How can we eliminate the gap between the global technological civilization which is by definition a unifying catalyst between all societies, and the local cultural identities which by nature are conducive to conflict within a global politics that enhances the clash of cultural identities? In other words, how can we remove the contradiction between global politics of identity and global technology?

This question is one about the future and concerns the forging of a global identity which

supersedes cultural identities. It, therefore, merits a futuristically-oriented view. A very adequate view, in my opinion, comes from the founder of the Science of Cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, which is contained in his famous book The Human Use of Human Beings first published: 1950. The term 'Cybernetics' was invented by Wiener in his first book bearing the Cybernetics in 1948. The term is derived from the Greek word 'kubernetes' or 'steersman', the same Greek word from which the word 'governor' is derived. Hence, the core significance of Cybernetics is 'control', in opposition tom entropy.

In giving the definition of Cybernetics, Wiener classed communication and control together. The reason for this linkage is due to the fact that communication necessarily imparts a message which contains information that is accessible to the person who communicates the message. The technique of communication involves control based on consciousness of the messages. Hence, control requires consciousness of the messages using communication facilities. Wiener had prognosticated in 1950 that "in the future development of these messages and communication facilities, messages between man and machines, between machines and man, and between machine and machine, are destined to play an ever-increasing part." (p. 16) In this way, Wiener eliminated the gap between the organic (man) and the inorganic (machines), and the reason for this

elimination is consciousness of the messages being imparted.

The question that could be raised here is: What is the connection between Cybernetics and identity, or precisely, cultural identity? Or put otherwise, how can Cybernetics help in rescuing the world from global ethnic and cultural conflicts, which result from the politics of cultural identity?

Wiener's prognosis about the integration of man and machines in the process of communication of information became a reality and a fact of life with the emergence of the Cyber Age in the 1970s. Jerome Glenn, the American futurologist, clarifies this idea in his book Future Mind published 19 : "There seems to be a conscious consensus among the industrial population about the future – that human beings will be as integrated with technology as technology will be integrated with consciousness. Technology can already simulate the human characteristics of recognition, voice synthesis and intelligent computer programming. At the same time, it is being miniaturized for human bodies – both to replace organs and to amplify human capacity. So when the two trends come together – some time between 2025 and 2050 – distinctions between humans and machines will blur and Conscious Technology will emerge. When that actually happens – the 21st c., we will have a world renaissance that would properly be called the "Conscious Technology Civilization." (p. 1)

In my opinion, this futuristic "Conscious Technology Civilization" will supersede cultural identities and create what could be called a global Cyber-identity. This global Cyber-identity represents an explosion in human consciousness which creates technology and which, in turn, expands human consciousness which, in turn, improves our technology (Glenn, p. 2) In this new civilization, according to Glenn, technology is a mirror of consciousness ... and looking into this mirror changes our consciousness." (p. 2)

The question now is:

Will the conscious technology civilization and the knowledge society result in the technological identity or more precisely, the global Cyber-identity, and will this new identity replace the existing cultural identities?

In order to answer this question, it would be clear that the cultural hallmarks of this new rising global civilization is creativity through a total integration between human mind and Cyber technology, through this creativity consciousness and control will be the steering qualities of human identity and will thus undermine cultural differences which enhance cultural conflicts. In the process of this century, it is expected that this identity will emerge and flourish and will thus face many clashes and conflicts and perhaps regional wars. It will ultimately emerge and spread and become a fact of life.

Crisis of Civilizations, an Experience of the Past: An Encounter of Zoroastrianism with Islam

Marietta Stepanyants (Russia)

Reflecting of the crisis of civilizations and its consequences in present time it might be useful to look into the experiences of the past and thus to take from it the lessons to avoid the most dramatic course of the events in the future.

The encounter of Islam with Zoroastrianism had the most tragic outcome; the latter was practically pushed out from its homeland and replaced by the religion of Mohammed. Hence, it is quite common to affirm that this model illustrates the encounter which leads to the destruction of one civilization by another, and the whole blame for that is put on Islam. However, the case is not as simple as it might seem.

The direct encounter of the two cultures took place in VIIth century when the Sassanian State collapsed and Iran became a part of the Caliphate. Yet, before that devastating for Zoroastrianism encounter an indirect "meeting" took place and resulted in the borrowing by Islam of a number of Zoroastrian ideas. This statement might claim to be true if we are disinclined to share the views of those who (referring mainly to Arab sources) assert that Zoroaster was born in 628 BC, and instead prefer to agree with those, who (like Mary Boyce) date the origin of the religion of Zoroaster between 1400-1000 BC. Then Zoroaster was

the contemporary of Moses and it is easier to support influence from Iran to the eastern Mediterranean world. A number of specific examples of parallels certify the existence of influence. Two of them are of the most importance: dualism, which either prompted or promoted the development of the ideas of Satan and of an array of angels and demons, and eschatology.

There are two opposite versions of the events. One says that the Arabs converted Zoroastrians at the point of the sword: "All that was Iran's whether spiritual or material was swept away by the Arabs - a sacrifice of their fanaticism. The religion, the language, the orthography, and the manners and customs of Iran took quite a different complexion or got entirely abolished". (1) The extreme opposite view finds the explanation of why "at the very first shock with fresh and vigorous Islam the power of old Iran simply melted away" (2) in "the indifference of the Ummayyads and the conscientious observance, by the Abbasids, of the tolerance prescribed towards non-Muslims who were 'Peoples of the Book'." (3)

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(1) Pour Davoud. *Introduction to the Holy Gathas*. Trans. by D. J. Irani. Bombay: Iranian Zoroastrian Anjuman and the Iran League, 1927, p. 7.

(2) S. Taraporewala. *The Religion of Zarathushtra*. Tehran: Sazman-e-Faravahar, 1980, p.72.

(3) Arnold J. Toynbee. *A Study of History*. In two Vols. Abridgment of volumes I-VI by D. C. Sommervell. N.Y.: Laurel, 1965, vol.11, p. 28.

It might be that the true story lies between the two diametrical views. Many Iranian regions and towns were indeed destroyed and their inhabitants were robbed, assaulted and killed. However, those Zoroastrians who accepted free willingly the authority of the new rulers were allowed to follow their religious believes. The general spirit of the conquerors may be seen from the following quotation from a treaty made by an Arab conqueror with the people of a Zoroastrian town: "Ye are secure and it is incumbent upon us to observe this treaty as long as ye observe it and pay the poll-tax and the land-tax". (4)

I have no desire in the least idealize the Arabs of the early period of Islamic expansion. There were undoubtedly many cases of violence and conversion by force. That is common to all the wars. Nevertheless, this particular episode of history should not be exaggerated, and one should recognize that there are certain grounds under the assertions about comparative tolerance of Muslim invaders. One of them is rooted in Islamic teaching itself.

Another reason for comparative tolerance demonstrated by the Arab invaders in the early period of Islamic rule in Persia was of a sound economic nature. As the Arab Caliphate extended its boundaries, it became vitally important to the state to possess a large number of non-Islamic subjects who could

(4) See: E. G. Browne. *Literary History of Persia*. In 4 Vols. Cambridge. 1924. Vol. 1, p. 200 ff.

contribute to its upkeep. This certainly curbed for a long time their zeal for proselytizing. [5]

Some historians claim that "the masses" willingly embraced the religion of Islam. The explanation to that - the state of affairs in the Sassanian Empire on the ever of the Muslim invasion: "Hidden underneath the outward splendor and the vast military achievements of the Sassanians there lurked the germs of decay". [6] The signs of the forthcoming final downfall of Zoroastrianism in Persia had been given by the emergence of several heretical movements.

Zoroastrianism during the rule of the Sassanian dynasty transformed into the instrument of politics. Arnold Toynbee believes that "Zoroastrianism had in the end to pay as heavily as Jewry for having lent itself to a political enterprise". [7] Under Ardashir (226-242) the Sassanian State had become a full-fledged theocracy. He himself was a priest and his priesthood had been inherited from a long line of ancestors.

The great role in strengthening the role of clergy had been played by the chief priest Karter who got the title of "the savior of the soul of the Shahinshah". He began his activity during the rule of Shapur I (241-272), under Hormizd Karter was made

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(5) I. J. S. Taraporewala. *The Religion of Zarathushtra*, p.73.

(6) Ibid., p. 72.

(7) Arnold Toynbee. Op. cit., Vol.1, p. 445.

magupat of Ormaz, that is the "chief of the magicians of Ahura Mazda". Bahram II gave him additional titles: "judge of the empire", "master of rites", "ruler of the fire" in the main temple, etc.

Zoroastrian clergy acquired a power second only to that one possessed by the Shah himself. The third force in the state was the landed aristocracy. They all three greatly misused their powers. Consequently, the masses were being ground down relentlessly and sunk to the deepest depth of poverty and misery. The unsuccessful wars of Firuz I (459-483) against the Huns added to the prevailing discontent. The high degree of social dissatisfaction can be proved by the emergence of Mazdakism (Mazdak started his activity in 488), its preaching is sometimes compared with that one of the Bolsheviks in Russia. (8)

In short, the victory of Muslim invaders over Zoroastrian Empire was primarily a triumph of a stronger state and military power over a weaker one.

Yet, it might be there were as well the causes of ideological nature acting in favor of Islam. I would dare to suggest that at least in four positions the teaching of Mohammed could look more attractive than the teaching of Zoroaster. First, the former was addressed to all peoples irrespective of race, ethnicity, language, etc. On the contrary, Zoroastrianism was a

(8) See I. J. S. Taraporewala, Op. cit., p. 171.

"provincially confined truth". [9] Like Judaism it is a geneoistic religion: all Persians were supposed to follow the teaching of Zoroaster, but no foreigners were allowed to convert (though in some periods of history, for example at the time of Karter, the end of the 3rd century, certain groups of non-Zoroastrians were converted by force). Even in modern days while Pour Davoud, a prominent Iranian scholar, who had contributed a lot to the study of Zoroastrianism, wanted to become its follower, Zoroastrian communities, both in Iran and India, rejected his request for a conversion. Besides, since Zoroastrianism had become the state religion it demonstrated great intolerance towards the followers of other religious believes, and persecuted Jews, Buddhists, Brahmins, Nasoreans, Christians, Manichaens as well as Mazdean heretics.

Second, Islam preached brotherhood and at least in its early period disapproved social discriminations. Zoroastrianism, particularly in the Sassanian empire differentiated its community into four groups. In the Dadestan i menog i xrad ("Judgments of the Spirit of Wisdom"), a Pahlavi text probably composed in the sixth century, the Spirit of Wisdom (or Goodness) in response to the questions about those four social groups describes in details the duties of their members (XXVII, 33-34). [10] It is well

(9) Cambridge *History of Islam*, Vol. 2B, p. 476.
(10) 3opoacmpuckue mekcmbl (Zoroastrian Texts). Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1997, pp. 103.

known that in India many of the low casts or outcasts (untouchables) free willingly converted into Islam hoping by this way to overcome caste discrimination. One could expect that the same motive was behind the mass conversion in Persia.

Third, Islam is attractive by the simplicity of its rituals. In the Sassanian days the faith of Zoroaster "had become so overlaid with outward ceremonial and mere bodily purifications and baths and penances for all occasions possible and impossible, that people ceased to care for such mere outer forms of purity, which neither inspired them nor satisfied spiritual thirst". (11)

Fourth, early Islam demonstrated a great ability for cultural assimilation, for incorporation in its teaching and practices the ideas, values and institutions borrowed from the others. That policy was justified by the most important dogmas of Islam which affirms: "There is no god but God, and Mohammed is His Prophet". (12)

According to Islam Mohammed is the "seal of prophecy", it means he is the last among the prophets sent to the people. This notion has different connotations. It could justify and promote both tolerance and fanaticism. The latter results form the claim that since Mohammed is the last of the prophets

(11) I. J. S. Taraporewala. Op. cit., pp. 19-20.
(12) This formula is translated quite often as "There is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is His Prophet".

it means that his message is the most perfect. However, the very fact of recognition of the authorities of those who had been professing before suggests certain respect towards other Sacred Books and their teachings. Consequently, that justifies and helps, on one hand, to borrow ideas, values and customs of other cultures, and, on the other hand, for the adherents of other religious believes to convert into Islam looked at as a continuation of prophesying in general.

The real persecution of the Zoroastrians, who by the middle of the 9th century remained to be an influential minority in Persia, was started by the Abbasids (752-804). During the rule of that dynasty Zoroastrian temples and sacred fire shrines were destroyed. The status of *zimmis* was taken from the Zoroastrians, and they were called now *kafirs* (that is non-believers). A great role in the persecution was played by the Islamic clergy of Persian origin. Later on the wild Mogul hordes of Changiz and Timur passed over Iran like a devastating flood and whatever were not yet destroyed were all drowned in the flood of destruction. From the 10th century onward Zoroastrians emigrated to India where they got a new name - the Parsis.

Irrespective of the wishes of 'the conqueror', to the oppression and persecution from its side towards the adherents of the other civilization, no civilization could be really extincted by any external force (though

it might be badly hurt). Civilization ceases to exist as the result of its inability to respond to the challenges of time, when its world outlook, consequently its ideals and values, become outdated.

In spite of 'physical' destruction (that is an expulsion of its institutions, clergy, believers, etc.) of Zoroastrianism, the latter continues to exist culturally, since many of its notions have become the organic parts of some of the most influential trends of Islamic thought (the examples of the mystical Sufism and the Illuminationist school are reviewed). That Zoroastrianism is still 'alive' could be as well confirmed by its 'resurrection' from time to time.

There is also another reason for declaring the vitality of Zoroastrian tradition. It might be appealed to in the search for ideological or ethical justification in response to the challenges of the time. The success of the Parsis community in India, which in spite of its small number has accomplished a lot since the British rule had introduced to India the capitalist economy, proves that the teaching of Zoroaster contains certain ideas (like ethical individualism, value of material prosperity, etc.) which allow its followers to adjust to the realities of the free market economy much easier than in the case of other religions of the East.

Modern Management Values
As a Reflection to One Human Civilization

Tarek Heggy *(Egypt)*

Though Modem Management Sciences are branched to numerous fields, yet it is very true to state that the entire notion of Modem Management boils down to a short list of principal values. All Modem Management Sciences, techniques and tools emanated from these basic values that are reflected in every facet and theory of these Modem Management Sciences.

The most important of these values are the following:

Time Value:

Until "The Industrial Revolution in Europe", "TIME" had a completely different meaning and value. But with industry becoming the spine of the economic lives in many societies the impact of this phenomenon "TIME" got a different meaning, important and value. With the current development in economic lives from managing industry to managing services and value of time was elevated to a very high level and became one of the main factors that decide upon the success or failure of the economic units. This was well described by a famous management expert who said that while in the past "the big ones" were eating "the small ones" now and in the future "the fast ones" will be eating "the slow ones".

From this sophisticated value of "TIME" some other very important values emanated such as punctuality, meeting deadlines, delivering at projected time and characterizing, through the time value and these sub-values, an important facet of Quality Management.

If we look at "Time Value" from civilization viewpoint we can not say that it is a Western value. Though it did flourish in Europe yet it has similarly spread in Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia on equal footing which proved the point that it is more of a human value rather than European or American ones.

Human Resources Value:

Though economic prosperity requires monetary funds, natural resources and people who undertake the various missions from "plan" to "reality" it remains absolutely true that people (i.e. Human Resources) are the ones who make the difference between failure and success. Moving from this belief that Human Resources are the main factor behind any economic success made the Modem Management Sciences give their utmost attention and prime focus to Human Resources Management from Recruitment to Training, to Career Development, to Selection of Leadership, to many other segments of Human Resources (HR) all translate the belief that people are the key to success

and development as they may be the key to losses and failure.

We are here before a phenomenon that is fully related to the development of the human mind and not to a special race, religion or culture and the evidence is that in many entirely different cultures the same high degree of importance is paid to Human Resource, whether we are in the Far East or Europe or North America. We are here again with another evidence that whilst we undeniably have different cultures but yet this is all "within one march of Human Civilization".

The Notion of Quality:

Today, with the greatest majority of the economic activities whether labeled as managing industry or "managing service or services" the whole game boils down to producing a product or rendering a service that is better in quality and competitive in price. This game continued for decades to be played within countries. Today, with the world moving to less of protectionism and to more freedom for the products and services to cross the borders, the game is now, and more in the future, will be played not within countries but globally. This will ultimately mean that any person at any location will continue to try to buy the best quality product or service regardless the nationality of the maker. Whatever is better and cheaper will be more sold. In view of this characterization Total

Quality Management (TQM) has become and will remain to be a crucial player in the economic game.

Quality simply means that the produced product or rendered service complies with the requirement and expectation of the buyer of the product or the receiver of the service (the customer). Total Quality Management is a branch of Modem Management techniques that is featured with great complexity as it involves technological factors, R&D, marketing knowledge and mechanisms and enormous intercultural knowledge and understanding.

Once again, we are before a phenomenon that can not be described as French or British or Japanese. It is another modern Civilization tool that is offered to the Malaysians to implement and benefit from as it is offered to the Americans and Germans and simply it will be fully illogical to argue against this rationale i.e. to claim that the notion of quality is a Western Phenomenon that some people could abandon. Such a choice will be philosophically wrong and economically suicidal.

Team Work:

The experience of all the economies that witnessed significant advancement either in Europe and North America over the past century or in Asia and some Central and South American countries over the past three decades, indicate that "Team Work" has

been an undeniable factor of their success. Modern Management systems whether in Industrial, Technological, Marketing or service spheres can not realize quality and success unless the Team Work is the spine of the activities.

"Team Work" is a clear evidence that Modern Management values do not necessarily belong to a specific culture. As the father of TQM (Professor Deming) once said that though the idea of Quality Management was produced in the West, the optimum Team Work spirit exists, on a much larger scale, in the Far East. A remark that repeatedly proves that though we have numerous cultures in our modem life yet there is a layer above that which is the One Human Civilization that continues to progress in isolation of narrow notions such as identity or citizenship. We are here in a position to visualize what the great German Philosopher "Kant" meant when he talked about the "upper idea" - yes, there are upper ideas that mankind march on earth continues to move towards not as Germans or Americans or Japanese but as "Human Beings".

The Life Related Notion of R&D:

The difference between humanity attitude to Science in the year 1900 and its attitude today (in the year 2000) could simply be described as such: Science, Technology and Research have moved over a century from being closer to "an academic value" to

being very close to be nothing but tools to improve the quality of life, on one hand, and to enhance the economic viability and the commercial competitiveness of a very large number of products and services, on the other. In a few words, Science became more and more a servant to the Human Beings and to the economic activities with an increasingly obvious linkage between Science and its usage in life with a third dimension which is the impact of this on the competitiveness of products and services.

It is sad, in our society, to hear many people including some of those who are supposed to be "Educational System Setters" opposing and denying the modem phenomenon of relating Education, Science, Technology and Research to the quality of life and the economic competitiveness on equal basis. These people believe that such a statement is a reflection to the ruthless nature of Market economies. These people need to be reminded that those who segregated Education, Science, Technology and Research from life and economy have produced nothing but starving masses in many countries when the Governments were able to launch Missiles but at the same time totally unable to produce and provide the essence of Human Beings.

Both our Public Sector and Private Sector organizations do suffer, to a large extent, from the lack of solid R&D behind their activities. With this

phenomenon the chance of success in the age of Globalization would be nil.

Universality of Knowledge:

One of the dimensions of Globalization is the fact that Science, Technology, Marketing techniques, R&D and Management systems will now cross the borders with less restrictions. Therefore, those who would be equipped with global knowledge of what they produce (whether a product or a service) are the ones who may have a chance of global success. Under these conditions there will be no excuse for any economic unit not to know, as much as possible, about what all others in the same domain do in the entire world. Without this Universal Knowledge on each single core business the ability to produce a product or a service with a better quality and more competitive price will be an impossible mission.

The Intercultural Dimension of Management/Marketing:

One of the main differences between the socialist economies and market economies was the fact that the first was driven by production while the second was led by marketing. This crucially important difference is one of the keys of any economic success. The core of this dimension is to know more about others, their cultures, their perceptions and their needs.

This facet of Modern Management systems picturizes in a very clear manner my claim that

Modern Management is another proof that living with numerous cultures should not be contrary to the belief that we all live under the shade of One Human Civilization.

On the Problematic Relationship between Universality and Specificity

Jan Berting (Holland)

1. Introduction

As is mentioned in the rationale of this conference, 'the theme of "One civilisation, many Cultures" implies a major controversial issue, that is, the concepts of civilisation and culture, whether they are synonymous or historically interrelated entities, whether the relation between the two concepts is one of separation, and ultimately leading to conflicts and wars, or rather one of integration, interdependence, and ultimately unity and peace of civilisation'.

To this we can add that not only the relationship between those concepts is controversial, but also their connection with the social and cultural reality to which they refer in different ways. Different concepts of civilisation and culture are used by persons and groups, trying to 'colonise' our collective representations of the world we live in and as such to define our relations with this world. This often happens in opposition to dominant world-views in certain historical eras. A good example of this is Friedrich Herder, who coined the concept of *Volkvgeist* in **1774** in opposition to the ideas of the Enlightenment, emphasising in this way the uniqueness of each culture. Universal concepts such as Reality and Truth do not exist; all norms and ideas originate within a specific cultural context upon which

they are dependent. Here we are confronted with a radical opposition of historicist thinking to the rational and universal tenets of the Enlightenment. [1] This concept of *Volkvgeist* did have a strong impact on the development of Europe, more specifically on the relationships between Germany and France, as the concept implied a radical different conception of the relationships between individuals and their society and state. Today we could translate this concept of *Volkvgeist* with the concept of *collective identity* of a people, a concept that emerged in the political debates and in the social sciences since the beginning of the eighties of the last century. It is interesting to note that Goethe was at first attracted by Herder's ideas, but finally he rejected the idea that mutual understanding is restricted to members of the same culture. Man can, according to him, escape from the fatality of particularism. [2]

A recent example of an effort to colonise our minds is S. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order*. [3] In this study

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[1] F. Herder, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie des Menschheit*, 1784; id., *Une autre philosophie de l'histoire*, 1774.

[2] *Conversations de Goethe avec Eckermann*. Paris: Gallimard, p. 158. Alain Finkielkraut refers to this discussion in his *La défaite de la pensée*, Paris: Gallimard, 1987, p. 48.

[3] S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Worl Order*. New York: Simon I Scuuster, 1996.

he states that the future world order will be based on the existence of seven or perhaps eight civilisations, which are seen as the most embracing cultural units of humanity. As he defines these civilisations as collective identities (*Volkvgeister*) which regulate the behaviours of those who are comprised within them, tile future will inevitably be full of tensions and conflicts against which the European civilisation -that is Europe and the United States of America - has to prepare itself. After the dissolution of the USSR it is not a victorious liberalism and the end of history that will prevail, but this clash of cultures.

So we can note that in this type of debates it is not only the opposition between *universalism* and *cultural specificity*, but also between *collectivistic* or *holistic* and *individualistic* ways of thinking that come to the fore. Moreover, we have to ascertain whether the concepts of civilisation and culture are used as references to *open* or *closed* systems, to *weakly* or *strongly* integrated systems or patterns and as concepts that refer to an *all-inclusive* way of life or only to *a specific part of human behaviour* and thinking.

2. The Concept of Civilisation

Let us start with the concept of civilisation. According to Fernand Braudel the word 'civilisation' appears only in the French language in the 18th century as a neologism; derived from 'civilisé', 'civiliser' (16th

century), to denote the passage to a civilised era.[4] The rise of the concept of civilisation in Europe was marked by national differences. The analysis of the concepts of 'civilisation' and 'culture' by Elias brings these national differences between France, England and Germany very clearly to the fore.[5] Elias concludes that the construction of national consciousness, as reflected by those two notions, is not the same everywhere. He points out that the concept of European civilisation refers to a continuous movement. According to Elias, this process gradually effaces the differences between the peoples of Europe.

In contrast to this, the German conception of culture emphasises differences, the specific character of a nation, and its specific cultural products. This German conception of culture - a retarded nation in this period- highlights a nation's specificity, its unique 'Volksgeist'. Elias' analysis elucidates the relationships, which exist between the social position of groups (such as national elites), and their ideas about culture and civilisation. He explains the role of

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[4] Fernand Braudel, *Grammaire des civilisations*. Paris: Flammarion, 1987, p. 33.

[5] N. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation, Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*. Basel: Haus zum Falken, 1939. See also: J. Berting, 'European Social Transformations and European Culture', in: M. Doornbos and S. Kaviraj, eds., *Dynamics of State Formation, Indio and Europe Compared*. New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 1997, chapter 16.

the bourgeois classes in the process of industrialisation and modernisation. The role varies from country to country in several respects. In the nineteenth century the differences between the elites of the leading European nation were clearly related to the main currents of thought of that time. A main current was one of confidence in the benevolent effects of the progress of science and industrialisation on social life as this progress pushed aside the traditional beliefs and structures and contributed to the emergence of a new type of society based on rationality, individualism, universalism and cosmopolitism (connecting in this way the values of the Enlightenment with the ideas of evolutionism).

These developments were opposed by those who abhorred the idea of a society based on contract and the achievements of 'free' individuals. They pointed out that individuals derive their dignity from the specific identity of groups or cultures to which they belong and by which they are culturally coined. From this perspective, social evolution entails the formation of a totality, a culture with its own specific identity.

The concept of civilisation is, in this context, a hierarchical one. The civilisation is 'higher' than other cultures and is more 'advanced' than these. Moreover, it is in this type of thinking also the 'highest' civilisation. It does not exclude the existence of other civilisations on earth. This is evident in the

evolutionary scale developed by Morgan in his *Ancient Society*[6] Morgan stated that human development must pass through three stages of progress, called savagery, barbarism and civilisation. The invention of pottery marks the passage from savagery to barbarism and the invention of writing marks the passage to the stage of civilisation. This implies that we can speak about civilisation in plural, although it is evident that in this way of thinking the European civilisation is at the apex of the evolutionary development.

In a certain way this type of thinking continues with the idea that 'globalisation means "Westernisation" which (it is believed) is a necessary condition for economic growth'.[7]

Another use of the concept of civilisation is to refer to *the specific way of life in large cities as civilisation*. This notion is already present in the works of Ibn Khaldun in the XIVth century. He speaks about 'Omran', which means urbanism, a term that has for him the same meaning as 'Hadarah' or civilisation.[8]

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[6] L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London, 1877.

[7] R. A. Shweder, 'Rethinking the Object of Anthropology (and Ending Up Where Kroeber and Kluckhohn began)', in: *Items & Issues of the Social Science Council*, Vol. 1, no. 11, Summer 2000, p. 7.

[8] See Ibrahim Madkour, 'La civilisation, le mot et liidée', in: Mourad Wahba, Ed., *Philosophy & Civilisation. Proceedings of the First Afro-*

Civilisation refers here to the urban way of life as complex and heterogeneous. All over the world, the way of life in cities has many things in common. As the population of the world is more and more concentrated in very large cities, we could say that civilisation as an urban way of life is developing rapidly as a global civilisation.

Still another meaning can be given to the concept of civilisation, as does Huntington to whom we referred earlier: a civilisation is the largest cultural unit that can be discerned on our globe. As such he distinguishes the 1) Chinese civilisation; 2) Japanese civilisation; 3) Hindu civilisation; 4) Muslim civilisation; 5) Occidental civilisation; 6) Latin-American civilisation, which can perhaps be considered as a sub-civilisation of the Occidental civilisation; 7) African civilisation. These civilisations as cultural units are self-contained and in spite of the modern globalisation they diverge and cultural differences become more rigid, according to him. We will have the opportunity to comment on this position later on in this contribution. In fact, Huntington uses this concept of civilisation to refer to a specific type of culture: cultures that are 'complex' or 'high' cultures. Anyhow, he does not pay attention to the cultures, which are not included in his scheme, such as the Australian Aborigines, the Malay culture(s), and the Jewish culture (which is, nevertheless, given some

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Asian Philosophy Conference, 13th to 16th March 1978, Cairo, 978, p. 1.

attention in a footnote on page 56 of his *Clash of Civilizations*).

The Concept of Culture

We have already seen that it is not really possible to make a clear distinction between the concepts of civilisation and of culture. In some cases the two concepts are treated as synonyms, sometimes civilisations are defined as a specific category of cultures.

The concept of culture is often used in the social sciences in an all-inclusive way. More than a century ago Tylor defined culture as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. [9] Culture refers to all human activities, which are learned, not instinctive, and which are transmitted from generation to generation through various learning processes. Culture also includes, in most of this type of definitions, the material products of human activities, the material culture.

It is evident that culture defined in this way implies that there are no human groups without culture.

There are, however, other types of general definitions of culture, which emphasise the plurality of

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[9] E. B. Taylor, *Primitive Culture*. London, 1891.

cultures. See, e.g. the following definition in which culture is defined as 'a way of thinking, feeling, believing. It is the knowledge stored up '(in memories of men, in books and objects) for Kluckhohn remarks. [10] In this definition culture does not refer to behaviour itself and its products. Culture is 'covert culture'; it is 'inside us' as a consequence of belonging to a specific group or society. Seen in this way, culture is 'one facet of human life. It is that part which is learned by people as the result of belonging to some particular group, and it is that part which is shared with others. [11] This definition implies cultural relativism, as different groups and societies have developed different ways of thinking, feeling and believing.

The general concept of *culture is an abstraction*. That is not the case for the concept of 'a culture', defined by Kluckhohn as 'an historically derived system of explicit and implicit design for living that tends to be shared by all or specially designed members of a group. [12] This precaution is also evident in the definition that he gives at the end of his analysis: 'Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted

[10] C. Kluckhohn, 'The Concept of Culture', in: C. Kluckhohn, *Culture and Behavior*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. 25.

[11] C. Kluckhohn, O. C., p. 25.

[12] C. Kluckhohn, O. C., p. 56.

by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and specially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning influences upon further action'. [13] Man is one, cultures are many'. [14]

In these definitions of culture as a way of thinking, feeling and believing, Kluckhohn is careful not to define a culture as a closed system. He speaks about a design for living that *tends to be shared*, which is *a facet of human life*. Moreover, culture consists out of *patterns*, but he does not refer to a culture as *a pattern*.

Some definitions of a culture may be much more imperative, such as the definition of a culture as 'the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from another'. [15]

One important step further is the definition of a culture as *a culture pattern*, as a totality in which all of

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[13] C. Kluckhohn, O. C., p. 73

[14] C. Kluckhohn, O. C., p. 71.

[15] G. Hofstede, cited by R. C. Lewis in his *When Cultures Collide. Managing Successfully across Cultures*. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1996, p. 25.

the elements have their meaning as part of this pattern, characterised by a specific pivotal ethos. This is the way Ruth Benedict cultures in her well-known and influential *Patterns of Culture*. [16] Here, we witness the influence of the German school of cultural history and of the Gestalt theory in psychology, which emphasised the fact that the way we perceive an element in a configuration or Gestalt, is determined by this Gestalt. In the same vein we encounter this way of thinking in many approaches in which societies and groups are seen as social systems; which are characterised by a specific cultural system. This is the case in the functionalist approach. The cultural system legitimises a society's normative order, says Parsons. 'Legitimization systems define the reasons for members' rights and for the prohibitions incumbent upon them'. [17] We encounter the same holistic approach of culture in a recent formulation by Shweder: 'By "culture" I mean community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful and efficient. To be "cultural" those ideas about truth, goodness, beauty and efficiency must be socially inherited and customary; and they must be actually constitutive of different ways of life'. [18] Here culture is seen as 'an

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[16] R. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

[17] T. Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 11.

[18] R. A. Shweder, O. C., p. 7.

informing spirit' of a whole way of life. This very much resembles Herder's 'Volksgeist'. This idealist approach can be contrasted with a materialist approach, in which culture is seen as the product of a whole social order, 'as the direct or indirect product of an order primarily constituted by other social activities' [19], as Williams says. He observes a convergence between the two approaches of culture. In this convergent approach, there is an 'emphasis on cultural practices as (though now among others) *constitutive*. But instead of the 'informing spirit' which was held to constitute all other activities, it sees culture as the *signifying system* through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored'. [20]

Related to this way of thinking, but more dynamic, is the approach of Bauman, who sees culture as the perpetual effort to overcome this dichotomy between spirit and matter. 'Creativity and dependence are two indispensable aspects of human existence, not only conditioning, but reinforcing each other; they cannot be transcended conclusively - they overcome their own antinomy only by re-creating it.

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[19] R. Williams, *Culture*. Fontana Paperbacks, 1981, p. 12.

[20] R. Williams, O. C., p. 13.

A Brief Comment on the Concepts of Civilisation and Culture

What can we learn from the preceding analysis of the concepts of civilisation and of culture? Can we say that it is evident that there are many civilisations and many cultures? Or, that after the impact of the Occidental civilisation on the world, and after a period of ongoing Westernisation, we are now aware that our world consists of several cultures? That seems to be a far too simple position. In the first place the existing civilisations are certainly not immutable and closed systems, but are changing in several respects, albeit that in this process important cultural differences are not necessarily waning. Secondly, it can be remarked that there is a civilisation in the making in the sense of a specific way of life in large cities. This process goes hand in hand with the coming of a global civilisation in the wake of the development of global markets and the development of modern information technology. One could say that this is an ongoing Westernisation. It is certainly true that this process started in the West, but in our era it is also dependent upon technical and economic developments in the non-western world, which have an impact elsewhere, even on the Western civilisation. Some will say that this type of civilisation concerns in the first place a new global, cosmopolitan elite, with only scant roots in their cultures of origin. This is a point to be considered seriously, although we can observe that parts, larger than a global elite, are concerned by this development. Is it really a necessary condition of a global civilisation to cover the majority

of the population of the world? Moreover, is it totally impossible to be imbued by this global civilisation and by a more specific civilisation or culture? Most of us belong to regional cultures and national cultures at the same time without of alienation. Why should it be otherwise when we are, in a certain respect, included in a still larger cultural unit?

An important observation can be made pertaining to the boundaries of civilisations and cultures. We have seen that the debate on the opposition between universality and specificity is still very vigorous. This debate is closely linked to another opposition, namely between collectivism and individualism. As it was the case in Europe in 18th century, those who strongly emphasise the importance of cultural specificity and collectivism seem to think and act in defence of existing cultural differences. Hence their attachment to culture or civilisation as integrated systems, which determine all acts of those who are considered by them to belong to a given cultural system. By doing so, they efface the personalities of the individuals, who become only an element of the system, without real individual choices. It implies also, in most cases, that what exists, is good. Hence there is no need for Human Rights, no need for democratic rights for everyone. Our analysis of the concepts of civilisation and of culture shows, however, that it is quite possible to treat cultural systems as open systems and that, moreover, it is not necessary to imply that they are perfectly integrated and determine

the behaviour of all of the members of a society. This point is certainly of extreme importance when we speak about civilisation as major cultural units. All such cultural systems comprise many national, regional and local cultures which have in most cases a common core, but who may also be very different from one another, with customs and habits, which are incommensurable. On the other hand, regions belonging to different neighbouring civilisations may have many characteristics in common, as is, e.g., the case with the populations, which live on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Collective Representations

We cannot understand intercultural relations without taking into account the role of collective representations and collective identities. We need those concepts when we turn to the inside view on social life: in which ways do different social groups perceive their (social) environment and their place in it? What types of interpretation do they -and we - give to events such as encounters with persons and groups with ways of life which differ from theirs? The concepts of collective representation and collective identity are closely linked. We define collective representations as mental images which persons and collectivities have about the (social) reality they live in, but also about social worlds with which they do not have direct experiences. Collective representations are mental maps of the social scene about which Jodelet says: 'It is a socially developed and shared type of

knowledge. This knowledge has a practical meaning and contributes to the construction of a common reality of a social unity'. (translation JB)[21] However, that is not to say that those groups and persons who have specific collective representations, are always fully aware of this. Collective representations may be, according to them, the images of social reality as it really is. Those who do not share their view on social life are simply erring. Such a type of collective representation is in the minds of those persons who state that modern society is nothing more than a totality of market relations or those who think that modern society is basically a system of exploitation of workers by a capitalist class. In those cases the collective representation is also a *conviction* or a *belief*. It may be so self-evident to those who cherish the collective representation, that they reject vehemently the idea that a different and valid interpretation of reality may be possible.

Although the cognitive character of collective representations is prevalent, this is not to say that the collective representation is only that. As follows from what we said earlier, there is also an *evaluative element*. Participants to social life may be convinced that their collective representation is true and that the collective images of the other are false. Moreover, the

[21] D. Jodelet, 'Représentations sociales: un domaine en expansion', in: D. Jodelet, réd., *Les représentations sociales*. Presses Universitaires de France, 1989, p. 36.

collective representation may be judged to be 'good' (or, in many cases, to be bad when one is referring to the collective representations of opponents) in line with the collective goals of members of a collectivity.

Collective representations are very functional for a given social unity. When we say this, we do not mean that collective representations do not pose problems in intergroup relations, problems which may often have a serious character. In fact the analysis of such intergroup problems is the central theme of this contribution. Nevertheless, the functionality of collective representations for group life is evident. Collective representations are, in the first place, means by which persons and groups orient themselves in an otherwise extremely complex and incomprehensible world. They give indications *about who we are and who are the others*. They offer a grip on the world that otherwise would not be understandable. Collective representations are connected with an awareness of differences between categories of human beings, - differences that may be much more refined than the distinction between 'them' and 'us'-, and of course of differences between animals and material objects. They give indications about what should be done and what not, and they orient our feelings of belongingness. They are certainly also the source of oppositions between one's own identity and those of the others, the outsiders. Moreover, they are connected with feelings of commitment and solidarity. Collective representations are tied to codes of inclusion and

exclusion, to distinctions between 'pure' and impure', between 'savage' and 'civilised', between 'natural' and processed. They are burdened with metaphors and symbols.

Following the notion of culture as 'covert', it becomes evident that group members are not hilly conscious of the nature of their collective representations. When we question group members, we can get descriptions about how they see themselves as similar to and different from other groups, the others. Such a description leaves out many things of which they are not aware. Here it is useful to introduce the concept of *habitus*, as used with a specific meaning by Bourdieu. The concept seems to be rather similar to the concept of state of mind or mentality (état psychique) as used by Pareto: a basic tendency in the members of a group or subgroup, produced by biological motives in combination with growing up under specific social, economic and cultural conditions, such as the family structure, the language which structures, by imposing categories, the ways we perceive the outside world. This 'état psychique' is very stable and almost unchangeable[22] Bourdieu's concept of habitus comes very near to the preceding one. He states that the collectivity is deposited in each individual in the form of durable dispositions, as

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[22] V. Pareto, *Traité de Sociologie générale*. Librairie Droz, Genève, 1968 (1917-1919, en 2 vol.) chapitre VI.

mental structures. [23] *Habitus* is a concept referring to modes of conduct, taste, feelings, which predominate among members of a particular group. It refers to acquired tendencies as a member of a specific group or culture, tendencies, which for the persons concerned are largely unconscious. [24]

Collective representations are, as we said earlier, mental maps, systematic ways of perceiving the outside (social) world. Collective representations are as such conscious constructions. People, when asked, can report about the way they 'see' the outside world. This does not mean, that the members of a group are always conscious of the fact that they see reality through a collective representation. They may think that the way they perceive reality *is* reality as it is. But also when they are aware of the fact that their

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[23] P. Bourdieu, *Questions de Sociologie*. Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1984.

[24] Habitus seems also akin the concept of basic personality structure, as elaborated by Kardiner and Linton. This concept is related to the effort to apply to cultures a psychoanalytic approach in combination with the analysis of the role played by social factors in determining psychological phenomena. Kardiner and Linton state that the basic personality structure 'represents the constellation of personality characteristics which would be congenial with the total range of institutions comprised within a given culture'. (A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*. 1939, IV) As such it includes techniques of thinking, or idea constellation; the security system of the individual; super-ego formation and attitudes to supernatural beings'. In general, it represents that which differentiates the personalities of members of two different cultural communities'. (O. Klineberg, *Social Psychology*. New York: Henry Holt I Company, 1950, p. 498.

collective representations are not pictures of reality (in the sense of 'Abbildung'), they will not be aware in which ways their habitus, acquired as member of their specific culture, determines their way of looking at the world around them, of interpreting the ways of life of other groups. Here a comparison with language is adequate. When we speak a language, especially our mother language, we are barely aware of its syntax and grammar. Even less will we be aware of the specific ways in which our language structures our thinking by imposing categories and making distinctions which are far from being universal. When we make a distinction between collective representations as pertaining to the conscious level and habitus to the unconscious level, we must keep in mind that the demarcation-line between the two levels is not rigid. Changing social conditions, especially increasing contact with members of the other groups, the outsiders, may raise the level of awareness of habitus as a hidden side of group life.

Collective Identities

What about collective identities? Collective identities are strongly tied to the concept of collective representation. Collective identities: 'are the means whereby people define a sense of themselves and others through using different markers, such as cultural features. Identities refer to what people conceive themselves to be, to which collectivities they

belong'. [25] Collective identity refers to the ways a group sees itself as different in comparison to other groups. Collective identity is anchored in the consciousness of the members of a group. We could, indeed speak about group consciousness in the sense of a consciousness of belonging to a social class, a religious group, a nation, an ethnic group, a professional group etc. But let us stretch the concept not too much. Collective identity in the sense we use it here is strongly determined by the *habitus*, the tendencies acquired by the members of group before coming of age. The members of the group have been' invaded' by the culture of their group before competing structures, except for biological conditions, were present. This is what Freud called 'the primacy principle'. Later collective identities, especially after growing up, have been grafted on the former, such as professional identities or collective identities related to voluntary associations, which are joined as adults. Habitus plays also a role on this level, because the tendencies acquired in the first period of the life of an individual tend to influence the selection processes later on, such as those related to preferences for certain artistic and professional activities.

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[25] K. von Benda-Beckmann and M. Verkuyten, 'Introduction: cultural identity and development in Europe', in: K. von Benda-Beckmann and M. Verkuyten, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity*. Utrecht University, 1995.

Collective Stereotypes

Also collective stereotypes belong to the domain of collective representations and as such they have many characteristics in common with the former. Analysis shows us that collective stereotypes provide the members of a group - nation, a people, a community - with ready-made and shared frames of reference which enable them to structure in a socially meaningful way the outside world, the other groups of people. Moreover, they facilitate communication among members of a community as they provide shorthand for complex collective representations. As collective stereotypes, they contribute to the social cohesion among the members of a community as they accentuate the sense of belongingness ('we-feeling'); they articulate common values of a community by contrasting its values with those of 'the other'; they may be used to accentuate in a positive way that our community is different from an other one with which it may be confused by outsiders. This function is often emphasised in international advertisements ('corporate identity of a nation'); they may be used for exclusion of persons and groups which are considered having habits and values which are a menace to 'our' values (discrimination); they may be used by persons in a collectivity to demonstrate their loyalty -true or false- to the collectivity; finally, they provide a collectivity with a scapegoat when hit by adverse

conditions. [26] Collective stereotypes are, as elements of collective representations, social constructions and as such they are 'cultural products'. They are present in the consciousness of the members of the group, as rigid, inflexible, 'frozen' elements of collective representations. The link with observable characteristics of the groups which are 'described' by the stereotypes is almost absent. They are impenetrable for objective facts about the groups concerned and as such efforts to instruct people about the inadequacy of their negative stereotypes and the prejudices that accompany them do not have durable effects. In this respect they are the opposite of scientific social theories. A social scientist is *idealiter* aware that the theory he uses to describe and explain social reality is a *specific* way of approaching reality, among others, as he is aware that reality is far too complex to be accounted for in one theory or model. He must have good reasons to apply his approach and in the case that his theoretically based systematic observations falsify his theory, he must adapt his theoretical construction to the new facts at hand. Collective representations may resemble scientific theories when members of a group are aware that their collective representation is a specific way of looking

[26] J. Berting and C. Villain-Gandossi, 'The Role of Stereotypes in International Relations: A Systematic Introductory Analysis', in: J. Berting and C. Villain-Gandossi, eds. *The Role of Stereotypes in International Relations*. Erasmus University, RISBO, Rotterdam, 1994, 27-28.

at the world and that other groups have different collective representations to organise their life. But the awareness of the relativity of collective representations does normally not lead to systematic efforts to falsify them, although in political debates between opposing groups, arguments and scientific results are used to reinforce collective interpretations, e.g. about the causes of durable unemployment and the best strategy to reduce it. Collective stereotypes are very resistant to change. This resistance is related to the functions they have as markers between 'our' identity and 'theirs'. As old soldiers, they never die, but simply fade away when the socio-economic and political conditions change and erode the underlying habitus. This conclusion may be considered as a rather pessimistic one.

Politics and Religion: South Asian Perspective

Mohiuddin Ahmad (Bangladesh)

1. Context

One-fifth of the world's population lives in South Asia. The regional bloc, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (**SAARC**) has seven member countries, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. [1] Total population of the region is over 1.36 billion. [2] About 97 percent of the population live in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh who were part of a single political entity till August 1947. The region broke into pieces because of many factors. Religion was a key element in the Balkanization of India. That legacy still continues. At present, Islam is the 'state religion' in Bangladesh. India is a 'secular' country de jure, but a Hindu state by performance. Nepal is a 'Hindu Kingdom'. Pakistan is an 'Islamic Republic'.

How is South Asia doing? It may be difficult at this stage to portray a positive image of the region. A South Asian forum of activists working for trans-border alliance, evaluates the situation as follows:

> In the absence of healthy social development, violence of the dominant groups is unleashed to weaker groups in

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(1) SAARC was founded in August 1983 to foster intra-regional co-operation. The first summit meeting was held in Dhaka in December 1985.

(2) UNDP, Human Development Report 2000.

> terms of language, religion, ethnicity, cast and gender. The powerful sections of the society with their strong grip on the State and its institutions impose their own brand of ideology and statehood to oppress and plunder the people through both 'constitutional' and extra-constitutional modes. They use a system of a highly centralized planning and administration, which are top-down, bureaucratic, coercive, exploitative and immoral. The overwhelming majority of the population is diminished to a body of taxpayers, without any right of participation in the determination of their own destiny. [3]

Ethnic and religious chauvinism is increasing. The State is provoking chauvinism in many respects. The Hindu-Muslim riot, the marginalization of the *dalits* by *Brahminism*, increasing Sinhala (Buddhist) chauvinism against the *Tamils* (Hindu), killing of the Christian priests, discrimination and persecution of the minorities by the majority community, all are manifestations of a civil society, which can hardly claim itself 'civil'.

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(3) Mohiuddin Ahmad (ed.) South Asian Perspective, Nabodhara, Dhaka, 1996, p. 5.

As religion has become more and more instrumental in moulding a collective psychology, States are increasingly at loggerheads, which obstruct free flow of information and of the people. These rights are being curtailed in the pretext of 'national security'.

South Asia is the birthplace of many religions. This is a region where people from different faiths have managed to live together for centuries. Despite its historical rise and fall, the region has also succeeded in safeguarding some of its secular institutions. Some of the values, beliefs and practices of such institutions have made a significant contribution to human civilization. Those days are gone.

2. Hindu-Muslim Conflict

Hindus and Muslims are the two major communities in South Asia. The Muslim invasion was different from all other invasions in ancient India, viz. Persian, Greek, Huna, etc. The earlier foreigners came and lived in India and merged among the local Indians. But the Muslims did not completely merge with the locals. Gradually a wall of separatism grew among the Hindus and the Muslims. Al Biruni, an Indologist of the 11th century observed an "impassable ocean between the two communities". He wrote:

> "...they totally differ from us in religion, as we believe in nothing in which they

believed, and vice versa .... In all manners and usage, they differ from us to such a degree as to frighten their children with us, with our dress, and our ways and customs, and as to declare us to be devil's breed, and our doings as to the very opposite of that is good and proper.... All their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them, against all foreigners. They call them *mlechchas*, i.e., impure and forbid having any connection with them, be it by inter-marriage or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating and drinking with them, because thereby, they think they would be polluted. They consider us impure anything, which touches the fire and water of a foreigner.... They are not allowed to receive anybody who does not belong to them, even if he wished it, or was inclined to their religion. This, too, renders any connection with them quite impossible, and constitutes the widest gulf between us and them". (4)

The inherent religious character of the society and irreconcilibility of Hinduism and Islam forced the

(4) EC. Sachau, Alberuni's India (Translation of Kitab ul Hind), London, 1901, quoted by J. N. Sarkar, **Hindu-Muslim Relations in Medieval Bengal**, Idarah-I Adabiyat-I-Delli, Delhi, 1985, p. 11.

partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Although the top brass of the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League, the two major political parties of British India, were enlightened with modern European Education and followed secular ideas in their personal life, they failed to make significant inroads in the society. This means that the slogan of secularism did not help. M. N. Roy, the founder of the Communist Party of India in exile in 1921, argued: "secularism is not a political institution, it is a cultural atmosphere, which can not be created by the proclamation of individuals, however, highly placed and intensely sincere". (5) Social conditions were such that communal politics could easily take root.

Upper echelon of the Muslim community was concerned about its rights, privileges, protection and identity. Muslim identity was largely a reaction to Hindu chauvinism, which amounted to what may be called 'Hindu separatism'. (6) Muslim communalism may be attributed to the failure of Indian nationalism to develop a truly non-communal ethos despite the efforts of some leading Hindu leaders of the Indian National Congress. The call for unity by a section of Congress (Hindu) leaders was not convincing to the Muslim population. Gandhi tried his best to keep India one,

(5) M. N. Roy, Secularism Indeed, in T. Maniruzzaman, **Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends**, compiled in R. Ahmed (ed.), **Islam in Bangladesh - Society Culture and Politics**, Bangladesh Itihas Samity, Dhaka, 1983, p. 190.

(6) Tazeen M. Murshid, **The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourses** 1971-1977, UPL, Dhaka, 1996, p. 173.

though the leaders of the Muslim community smelled the ghost of Hindu revivalism in him. Against the Two-Nation theory of Jinnah, Gandhi's One-nation theory failed to break the ice in Muslim hearts and, instead, escalated further alienation. As Gandhi said:

> "In actual life, it is impossible to separate us into two nations. We are not two nations. Every Moslem will have a Hindu name if he goes back far enough in his family history. Every Moslem is merely a Hindu who has accepted Islam. That does not create nationality... We in India have a common culture. In the North, Hindi and Urdu are understood by both Hindus and Moslems. In Madras, Hindus and Moslems speak Tamil, and in Bengal, they both speak Bengali and neither Hindi nor Urdu. When communal riots take place, they are always provoked by incidents over cows and by religious processions. That means that it is our superstitions that create the trouble and not our separate nationalities". (7)

In the perception of the Muslim community, Indian nationalism was identified with aggressive Hindu revivalism, Hindu symbols, idioms and inspirations. With the exception of Khan Abdul Gaffar

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(7) Gandhi's conversation with Louis Fischer, 6 June 1942, Louis Fischer, **The Essential Gandhi**, Vintage Books, New York, 1983, p. 352.

Khan and Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, all prominent Muslim political leaders induced the idea to the common people that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together in one state. "Muslim India cannot accept any constitution, which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority Government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minority communities can only mean Hindu Raj". [8]

3. State and Religion

India

After the independence in August 1947, secularism in India soon lost its western fervour. The Indian leaders and jurists began to argue about, what they called the positive character of Indian secularism in contrast to the negative character of western secularism. As one Indian author wrote: "Indeed, Indian secularism recognises both the relevance and validity of religion in human life... In the context of the Constitution, secularism means that all religions practised in India are entitled to equal freedom and protection". [9] The obvious consequence was the dominance of the customs and tenets of the majority community, the Hindus, in the political and social spheres.

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(8) Jinnah's address to the *Muslim League* session at Lahore on 22 march 1940, quoted by Tazeen M. Murshid, **Op. cit.**, p. 198.

(9) P. B. Gajendragadkar, **The Concept of Secularism, in the Secular Democracy**, 1970, p. 71.

The Hindu religious rites are performed at the beginning of all state functions. Radio and TV channels are opened with Hindu devotional songs and music. Political leaders holding high offices take leading part in public religious ceremonies. Religion is impinging more and more on the political arena. As the manifestation of religion in politics has increased, so the incidence of communal riots. Localised riots take place almost every week. Religious forces play a greater role in the Indian politics today than in the early years of independence.

The growing militarism and the aspiration for recognition as a regional power has turned the Indian society more and more toward a state of *Hindutva*. One declared policy of the ruling **BJP** government is 'cultural nationalism' which is essentially Hindu nationalism. This includes mythical belief in the cultural and scientific achievements of ancient India, superior intelligence of the Hindus and India's destiny as the leader of the century. School textbooks full of patriotic hubris are being re-written; 'value education' is being promoted with a mix of upper caste Hindu morals, customs and values. [10]

Bangladesh

Political leaders in Bangladesh were more concordant than the Indians in the assertion of the

(10) Praful Bidwai, *Hindutva Thrust Continues*, **The Daily Star**, Dhaka, 4 September 2000.

secular character of the new State. Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, resisted the pressure to insert the word 'secular' in the Indian Constitution. On the other hand, the legislators of Bangladesh led by its founder President Sheikh Mujib incorporated secularism as a 'fundamental principle of state policy' in the Preamble of the Bangladesh Constitution. But again the gap between the proclamation and performance remained as wide in Bangladesh as it was in India.

Secularism in Bangladesh developed as a corollary of cultural-political movement for autonomy. Soon after the emergence of Pakistan, Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) was engaged in a protracted struggle over the sharing of political power and economic resources with Pakistan (former West Pakistan). It took the character of a conflict between the peoples of two far away territories having the same religion. Since the West Pakistani elite sought to legitimise their domination over East Pakistan in the name of building an Islamic State and tried to give religious character to a secular conflict, East Pakistan's mainstream political leaders opted for the separation of religion from politics. As a populist leader, Sheikh Mujib was aware of the depth of religious sentiment of the people. His secularism, therefore, did not mean the absence of religion in the public arena. He would protect and promote all religions at the social level but prevent their use and abuse in politics. As he himself explained:

"Secularism does not mean absence of religion. The seventy five million people of Bengal will have the right to religion. We do not want to ban religion by law. We have no intention of that kind. Secularism does not mean absence of religion. Muslims will observe their religion and no body in this state has the power to prevent that. Hindus will observe their religion and nobody has power to prevent that. Buddhists and Christians will observe their respective religions and nobody will be allowed to use religion as a political weapon". (11)

Sheikh Mujib was clearly advocating non-discriminatory secularism. With respect to separation of the religion from the State, he was more 'secular' than mere 'neutral' of the Indian type. A manifestation of this philosophy was the constitutional clause that prohibited the functioning of religion-based political parties. There was propaganda against his government that it was anti-Islamic. The situation however changed following the fall of the Mujib government and the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in a military coup in August 1975. It

(11) Sheikh Mujib's speech in the *Bangladesh Constituent Assembly* on 4 November 1972, the Dainik Bangla, Dhaka, 5 November 1972 (Translated).

may be mentioned that within one week of the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, Bangladesh received formal diplomatic recognition from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, though Bangladesh secured diplomatic recognition from all other 'Muslim countries' before.

Successive military governments in Bangladesh used the rhetoric of Islam in politics in a typical "Pakistani way". The term 'secularism' was erased from the Constitution by a stroke of pen. The Martial Law Proclamations Order No. 1 of 1977 inserted an invocation- Bismillah-Ar-Rahman-Ar-Rahim on the top of the Constitution. The same order removed the secular content of the Constitution by substituting the words "pledging that the high ideals of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah". A new clause was added to Article 25, which included Islamic input in the foreign policy of the country. It was mentioned in the clause that the State should "endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity". Article 12, which had defined secularism, prescribed procedures for achieving the goal of secularism and prohibited the use of religion for political purpose, was omitted by the Second Proclamation Order No. 111 of 1976.[12] Islam was declared a "State Religion" through a constitutional

(12) Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1979.

amendment in 1988 by a military-initiated parliament where there was no representation from mainstream political parties.

Pakistan

Pakistan seems to be one of the two states created on the basis of religion. The other one is Israel. In terms of geographical continuity, ethnic origin, language or the consciousness of its constituent population, there was hardly any justification in demanding Pakistan in the forties. The only element common to the protagonists of Pakistan was the fear of Hindu domination. But fear is a negative force, and of little value even to build up a small Community let alone to create one. A fragile community like Pakistan therefore needed a skilfully dedicated leadership to preserve itself. [13] Pakistan did not find one after Muhammad Ah Jinnah, the founder Governor General. Jinnah's 11 August 1947 speech before the nation was the possible exposition of a secular State in which religion and State were separate from each other. He said:

> "If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second, and last a

(13) Veena Kukreja, **Civil-Military Relations in South Asia**, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 37-38.

> citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make .... We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community - because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on - will vanish .... You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in the State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State. (14)

Soon the infatuation for secularism was over. Jinnah himself tried to play the 'Islamic' card to persuade the people in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to abandon the politics of 'separatism'. In less than one year's time, he made a complete turn of his earlier stance and said, "... have you forgotten the lesson that taught us thirteen hundred years ago? If I may point out, you are all outsiders here. Who were

(14) Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, **Speeches as Governor General** 1947-1948, Pakistan Publications, Karachi, pp. 8-9.

the original inhabitants of Bengal - not those who are now living. So what is the use of saying 'we are Bengalis, Sindhis, or Pathans, or Punjabis.' No, we are Muslims. Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with me that whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim." (15)

Successive governments in Pakistan, particularly after the military coup of 1977, have turned Pakistan into a state of theocracy. The government of General Zia-ul-Haq used Islam as a possible legitimisation strategy for the consolidation of his military rule. Lacking any legitimacy, Zia justified his military rule by a new claim, that it had a mission to create an Islamic polity and economy in Pakistan. Thus, Islam was considered to be a convenient cover with which the military junta sought to cover usurpation of power by providing legitimacy on the one hand, and a gambit to woo orthodox and reactionary elements on the other.

Theocracy means the rule of the clergy over the people. The natural effect of such a government is despotic oppression, because the clergy believes himself to be the representative of God and the legitimate authority for implementing what he believes to be God's commands on earth. In such a State, people have no right to express themselves. They are

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(15) Speech at Dhaka on 21 March, quoted by Sisir Gupta, Kashmir - **A Study in India-Pakistan Relations**, *Indian Council of World Affairs*, New Delhi, 1993, p. 414.

not allowed to criticise or disagree and oppose the clergy. A religious scholar self-righteously believes himself to be a religious authority, just because he belongs to a religious apparatus and not because of the people's view and popular endorsement. Therefore, if such a person attains power, he would be an irresponsible ruler. He does not hold himself accountable to the people.

Such a state of affairs would inevitably result in the creation of the most terrible form of despotism, oppression, tyranny, and personal dictatorship, because the spiritual ruler believes himself to be the shadow of God and God's representative on earth. (16) This seems to be the essence of Islamic fundamentalist politics, as practised in the region. And the *Jammat-i-Islami* is the vanguard.

In order to oppose popular movements launched for the achievement of socio-political rights, the *Jammat-i-Islami* and other Islam-pasand (Islam-loving) political parties have always raised the slogan of 'Islam is in danger' in order to establish itself as the sole custodian of Islam. Such a position has helped the ruling oligarchy to take advantage of the situation by suppressing popular aspirations in the name of Islam. The *Jamaat* leader and ideologue, Sayyid Abul Ala

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(16) A. Shariati, Collected Works, **Vol.** 22, p.197, quoted in Suroosh Irfani, **The Progressive Islamic Movement**, compiled in Asghar Khan (ed.), *Islam Politics and the State of Pakistan*, Zed Books, London, 1985, p. 63.

Maudoodi had over the years produced theoretical arguments for different political situations in Pakistan. The pro- Jamaat literature presents Maudoodi and the Jamaat as distinct from *all ulama* and political parties and has succeeded in gaining for Maudoodi the status of a scholar versed with not only in Islamic theology but in the modern social sciences as well. It is significant that the ruling oligarchy in Pakistan draws its ethos from Maudoodi's theory of Islamic State and is experimenting with his model. (17) Maudoodi's brand of democracy and franchise may be understood from the following statement:

> "The huge crowd, which is called the *Mussalman* nation, is such that 999 out of 1000 have got neither any knowledge of Islam, nor are they aware of the distinction between truth and falsehood. From the father to the son and from the son to the grandson they have just been acquiring the name of *Mussalman*. Therefore they are neither Muslims, nor they have accepted the truth by recognising it as truth, nor again rejected falsehood by recognising it as falsehood. If by handing over the reins of guidance into the hands of their majority vote somebody believes that the carriage will

(17) Zafaryab Ahmed, Maudoodi's Islamic State, in Asghar Khan (ed.). op. Cit., 96-97.

move along the path of Islam, his misconception is indeed praiseworthy". [18]

Until and unless the people are converted to the kind of Islam the Jamaat stands for, elections, according to its view, should be replaced by a process of selection in which such persons should wield power who are 'good Muslims'. According to the Jamaat, the purpose of the creation of Pakistan was to create an 'Islamic State', the political structure of which would ensure that only 'good' and 'real' Muslims wield power. It may be mentioned that Maudoodi and his party opposed the Pakistan movement in British India on the ground that it was secular in nature. [19]

4. Militarism

It is interesting to note that the military as a corporate interest group emerged as a major contender for political power in Pakistan in 1958 and in Bangladesh in 1975. Both the countries vigorously pursued Islamisation in some form or other under military regimes. Whereas in India, politics followed a 'civilian process without any interruption. This may be correlated with the whole issue of civil-military relationships in a society where Islam is the dominant ideology.

(18) Abul Ala Maudoodi, Tehrik-I-Azadi, pp. 139-40, quoted by Omar Asghar Khan, **Political and Economic Aspects of Islamisation**, compiled in Asghar Khan (ed.), op. cit. p. 140.

(19) Omar Asghar Khan, **Op. cit.**, P. 140.

In Islam, there has never been a distinct separation between the civil and military authorities, whereas the concept of civil-military relations in the western countries has essentially evolved out of secularism and the separation of the civilian functionaries from the military functionaries of government, with the former acting as controllers and the latter as subordinate professionals. Since in Islam there is no background of secularism and no distinction between the military and civilian components, a large number of Muslim States, consequently, are ruled by the military or dominated by the military. "The only ideology that seems to be popular and effective in Islamic countries is the Islamic ideology which, if anything, tends to be pro-military and excludes alternative ideologies from gaining ground. Thus, the trend of Islamic politics indicates a permanence of past patterns of military domination and Islamic support for military governments". [20]

5. Babri Masjid Syndrome

The destruction of the *Babri Masjid* on 6 December 1992, however, meant destruction of India's secular identity. In its destruction, a large section of the Hindu population saw a vindication of their right

(20) Saleem M. M. Qureshi, **Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis for Civil-Military Interaction**, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, February 1981, p. 27.

to assert their dominance over the Muslim minorities. This is also perceived by the Hindu mind as a vengeance against the misdemeanour committed by the Muslims when the latter was the ruler in the past. This was not totally unfounded. The travelogue of Ibn Battuta in the 14th century gives some account of the atrocities committed by the Muslims in the form of forcible conversion, mass enslavement and giving a lower status to the Hindus as *zimmis*. (21)

The shock waves from the demolition have rapidly travelled across the country and its frontiers carrying in their wake bloodshed, fear and anger. Although, following these events, the urban areas soon became tinderboxes of communal tension; in rural areas, the centuries old bond between the two communities to a large extent endured. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the carefully woven tapestry of peaceful coexistence has been stretched and in many areas the fabric held only by a slender thread of sanity.

The following observations may be made after careful analysis of the events of the Babri Masjid demolition and the aftermath:

(a) The people, especially the minority communities, have developed a deep sense of anger at, and distrust of State systems. The politicians refused to risk their safe seats by calling for sanity and humanity.

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(21) **Rehla of Ibn Battuta**, quoted by J. N. Sarkar, **Op. cit.**, p. 27.

(b) The States have failed to protect their people by refusing to act to enforce the rule of law, or to protect the interests of the minorities. States, instead of acting, have merely reacted and even this was painfully slow.

(c) Established political organisations, which uphold secular and democratic values, have failed to live up to their commitments and have not extended effective safeguards to minority communities. Nor have they succeeded in mobilising public opinion in favour of communal harmony. Their commitment to the people has seldom graduated from rhetoric.

(d) The existence of a strong communal bias in the ideology has significantly influenced the politics of governments. This has led to massive militarisation in the region including intense competition for production of nuclear bombs.

(e) The impact on the morale of minority communities of the violence and loss of life and property has generated a deep sense of insecurity, which has seriously undermined their long-term commitment to their countries. (22)

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(22) Mohiuddin Ahmad, **Op. cit.**, pp. 19-20.

6. Conclusion

India-Pakistan rivalry has crossed its all limits. They fought three full-scale wars between 1948 and 1971 and had another encounter in Kargil in 1999. Both of them have gone nuclear. There is a Hindu bomb in India and an Islamic bomb in Pakistan. After the nuclear tests, there was spontaneous jubilation in both the countries. There were only a handful of sensible politicians and small citizens' groups who protested against this arms race. Where one-third of the population are still struggling for a square meal, where a poor peasant can exchange his wife with a pair of bullock, where more children means more hands to fetch water and fuel-wood, it is still easy to harvest political benefits by exploiting religious sentiment. While Hindus and Muslims are increasing in number, sensible human beings are becoming more and more an endangered species.

Science and Humanism for the Modern World

V. V. Raman (India)

The history of human civilization is marked by several major revolutions, some slow and some abrupt, some dramatic and some subtle, some of local significance and some of global impact. Among the most important of these are the agricultural revolution which introduced sowing, harvesting, and storage of crops; the cultural revolution from which emerged abstract thoughts and ethical frameworks, as also philosophies and religious systems; the scientific revolution which changed the coordinates of our planet from cosmic center to an insignificant niche in an immeasurably vast expanse; and the industrial-technological revolution which harnesses matter and energy on the basis of a modern scientific understanding of the workings of the physical world.

It would be simplistic, indeed a distortion of history, to declare that in earlier times there was neither science nor technology. From the unrecorded dawn of consciousness, when the human mind wondered and human hands turned a stone or a stick this way and that to feel and fathom what it was, science has been there in every community and culture. And in periods now long past science flourished with creativity and vigor in ancient India and China, in Egypt and Mesopotamia, Greece and elsewhere. So too, devices have been contrived to lessen muscular effort and facilitate human

manipulation of the world since time immemorial. Wonderment and curiosity about the surroundings, and eagerness to diminish sweat and work are inherent to the human spirit.

What is characteristic of modern times is the universality of transnational science, and the ubiquity of modern technology. There is no member of the United Nations Organization where science is not taught, or planes don't land. Whether one understands science or decries it, no serious thinker or leader in the twentieth century can ignore science, or function without its technological offshoots.

In spite of all our national differences and cultural diversity, no matter what language we speak and what creeds we subscribe to, the one common thread that connects the minds of men and women in today's world is the thread of international science.

Religion

But there is more to life than curiosity and comfort. So too, there is more to culture than science and technology. Human beings wonder, not just about sun and stars, or rain and cloud, but also about the reason for life and the relevance of mind. We reflect on human existence, we question why we came to be, and we are intrigued by where we are heading to. We don't have an inkling of how we become individuals, what gives us a sense of self, much less of what happens to our thoughts and feelings once we are no

more. Then there is the longing for bonds, bonds with friends and families and loved ones, and also a subtle yearning to connect with the Whole.

Thus have arisen the religions of the world, for religions offer answers to such questions, often from the insights of keen thinkers, sometimes as revelations to superior seers. More importantly, religions have provided ethical frameworks for societies to function, and rites and rituals by which one communicates with the Beyond. Religions have been potent forces in human history. Their mission is to elevate us to our highest potentials, they have revealed esoteric truths. They cement groups and communities through common practices. They have inspired great art and music, architecture and literature. Associated with religion is spirituality. The spiritual experience leads to ecstasy, even to glimpses of the beyond.

The human body is a puny entity. This minuscule package of mind and matter emerged barely a couple of million years ago, through the slow silence of immutable physico-chemical laws, acting in harmony and at random too, for if the mystery of life can be tracked data to molecular bonds, no calculation could have predicted the confluence of countless factors that brought it into play. It was the most sublime manifestation of the chaos principle in action. Or was it perhaps a carefully conceived coordination of causal links? Who can tell!

But this we know: The human being is a good deal more than a biological bundle. There is in each of us the magic of thought and feeling, the glory of art and music, the excitement of love and the ennobling of ideals. Then there is the penetrating power of the mind that can fathom the ultimate nature of the complex world, reach the very ends of the universe, and mathematize the microcosm

Religions have lasted much longer than modern science. They too have had significant impacts on individuals and on civilizations. They have brought meaning and purpose to human life, injected joy, soothed sorrow, and guided our behavior in a myriad ways.

The Internationalization of Science

During long stretches of history, the scientific quest found many expressions in different regions and cultures. Now and again there were interactions here and there, and exchanges and influences among the interacting groups.

But the scientific revolution of the 16th century was of major significance. It was significant not so much in the discarding of geocentricity though this was one of its earliest steps; not so much in the discovery of elliptical planetary orbits and Jovian satellites though these opened our visions to hitherto hidden aspects of the universe, not even so much in the formulation of the laws of motion, though these

led to a deeper understanding of the physical world; but the modern scientific revolution was significant because it initiated a universality in the scientific framework which has transformed the very nature of the enterprise.

For, since the emergence of modern science, the enormous range of scientific efforts in different countries, and then in different continents, have come to be subsumed under a single umbrella, made up of an abstract international body of scientific practice and culture. The various nations of the world have their own research laboratories and publications, and yet, the works carried out and published in these geographically separated places are interwoven into a web held firm by invisible bonds that know no borders, that feel no cultural differences. The meter and the kilogram in any national bureau of standards are precisely the same, no matter what the religion or form of government may be in the country.

Science certainly has its local interests, narrow nationalism, and petty fights over priorities too. After all, it is only a human enterprise. There are rivalries and races in the pursuit of knowledge and competition in discoveries. There is national pride when a prize is announced. And yet, the technical work of scientists is blind to nationalities, they overlap and mingle like sounds from different instruments in an orchestra to create and constitute the grand symphony that science is. Indeed, the true strength and stature of modern

science lies in its universality. Science is no longer bits of insights here and there, nor imaginative speculations by keen minds in particular cultures. It surely is not parochial ethnic interpretations of natural phenomena, nor narratives from sacred books. Rather, science is a collective quest, a restless drive to eradicate every misunderstanding, to interpret every occurrence from the micro to the macrocosm, to unravel every mystery and dispel every doubt and darkness from the inquiring mind.

In no other context in human culture: not in art, nor in music, not in sports, much less in politics, do men and women of all races and colors, of all languages and religions, hold hands as comrades in a common pursuit. This speaks as much to the glory of the science as an enterprise, as any technological triumph that science might have achieved.

Religion, Separate and Universal

The scientific revolution merged diverse streams of search into a single surging river, as it were. But nothing of the kind happened in the realm of religion. Here the ancient roots stayed separate and sturdy, and the trees grew taller and vigorous too, shooting out branches along different directions, but the branches of a tree drew nourishment from their respective roots. Whether it was Judaism or Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, or Islam, each gave rise to different sects and schools, but in each instance, there was a core which was safe and secure.

Unlike with science, there arose no common religious institution to embrace all the faiths of humankind to form a single superstructure unto which all would come and pray. True, there have been efforts to repair old schisms, attempts to heal historical wounds, even movements to bring out the best from all religions. But Din Ilahis and Unitarians, Bahais, and Brahmos have been elite groups, rather than major religions with mass followings. If anything, over the past few centuries, newer groups have come and gone, new swamis and babas, new prophets and cult leaders, have forged more movements still.

One reason for this is that science is concerned with the external world of stark reality, whereas religion is linked to internal reality, to local moorings traditions, and community. Every religion is affiliated, not only to ancient prophets and personages, but also to time-honored rites and rituals, which have acquired the weight of centuries and the wisdom of ages. To reject all this and embrace a global network is far more difficult than to switch from the geocentric to the heliostatic model, or to use a telescope to probe the skies.

So it is that that in schools the world over the same laws of nature and the same mathematics are taught, the same facts of anatomy and the same genetic structures are explained, but in places of worship different symbols are venerated, different

eschatologies are expounded, and different days are prescribed for fasting and feasting.

Need for a Trans-Denominational Religion

This persistence of religious diversity is understandable. It has its cultural and aesthetic richness too. And yet, the situation is also crying for fresh perspectives. For ours has become a very complex world with complex interactions between peoples. It is a world where some nations are still firmly affiliated to a single specific religious loyalty, while others foster enlightened religious pluralism. It is a world where economic injustices and political squabbles still disfigure the face of human culture.

In such a world, it becomes all the more imperative that we try to bridge the chasm that perilously separates the peoples of the world. It is urgent that enlightened religious leaders from every faith and intellectuals from every culture inspire men and women of goodwill to complement their local loyalties with a larger global vision of trans-denominational perspectives which would not only enrich their own sensitivities for the sacred and the spiritual, but also serve to lessen the tensions and the mistrust among the more ardent, not to say, mindless enthusiasts among true-believers. In this effort, what we need to do is to extract from the various religions whatever is best and overlapping in values and in perspectives. It is in this context that humanism becomes relevant.

Humanism: Traditional Expressions

In the Western tradition, the origins of humanism are usually traced to Renaissance Italy in the 14th century where thinkers began to develop a growing interest in the thoughts and writings of the distant past. This gradually moved the minds of many from religio-spiritual abstractions and concern with the hereafter to matters more mundane and practical. Above all, it encouraged a spirit that was always inquiring, intellectually free, respectful of but not subservient to ancient lore.

Humanistic insights were expressed by many lay thinkers of ancient times. Confucius proclaimed that human nature is the same to begin with, but is molded differently through different encounters. He insisted on virtue and moral example rather than threats of punishment after death. Cicero of ancient Rome suggested that human knowledge and philosophical reflection should be the fuel for leading us towards humanistic ideals. Protagoras of Abdera's famous statement that "Man is the measure of all things" is a view that is essentially humanistic. The Latin poet Terence said:

> Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto:
> I am a man; nothing human can be foreign to me.

In the Hindu tradition, inclusiveness of all of humanity, is an intrinsic part of the religious framework. Thus, the Vedic prayer,

Lokaa samasthaa sukinko bhavantu

is an appeal for humanity's happiness rather than for just for one's own. A Yajurvedic poet wanted to speak the revealed truths to all the people.

yathemaam vaacam kalyaaneea aavadbaani janebhyah (YV: 26.18) The author of the Tamil work Puranbn (ru said:

> yaadum oori, yaavarum kilir:
> Everywhere is my country; everyone my kin.

The fifteenth century Telugu poet-philosopher Vemana wrote,

> If we look at places all over the earth,
> People, we see, have equal birth,
> In one great brotherhood made, I say
> Equal in God's eyes in every any way.

When John Milton wrote (Essay on Man: Epic. ii. 1),

> Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
> The proper study of mankind is Man

he was echoing a humanist's worldview. Dennis Diderot of the French Encyclopidie, declared Man to be "the sole and only limit whence one must part, and back to whom everything must return"

Clearly, the humanist attitude is neither new, nor confined to a particular civilization. This is not surprising since humanism is an expression of the natural affinity of human beings, an intra-species bond which tends to become hazy and weakened when local affiliations are formed, only because these latter provide the security that comes from closeness and family ties.

The Ethical Framework

Both science and religion are magnificent expressions of the human spirit. They have their visions, and they have their values. Each sees the world in a fulfilling way, and both stir our ethical potentials.

In the context of morality, we need to distinguish between a value system that is good for an enterprise, one that is concerned with the impact on others, and a third that is inspired by consequences to oneself. It is the first kind that we encounter in science, for every ethical principle the scientist follows is in the interest of obtaining correct scientific knowledge.

Statutory laws in civilized states are meant to curb instinctive behavior which is all too often self-centered and with little regard to its possible hurt on others. On the other hand, religions generally encourage and inculcate positive moral behavior. They promise rewards, and warn of punishments when one

transgresses the ethical code. Their goal is to bring out our best as moral beings.

Another context in which science enters the realm of ethics is in the search for the roots of moral principles. This is a topic that has been explored by behavioral scientists, geneticists, neuroscientists, and others. Their search had led to ideas and information which are often revealing, sometimes frightening. The related speculations, hypotheses, and findings are surely fascinating at the academic theoretical level. But they have contributed little for the moral betterment of individuals or societies. If anything, some of them reduce human behavior to trivial mechanical motions, robot-like actions over which the individual has no ultimate control. Insightful perhaps, interesting surely, but bereft of guidance or wisdom for the man on the street.

We need to find ways for ensuring the relevance and importance of morality even when it is declared to be no more than an emergent property of DNA structures. These then are among the challenges for the coming century:

To benefit from the findings of science, yet not be overwhelmed by its tenets that reduce the human spirit to a complex of atoms and molecules.

To recognize the role of genes and neurons, yet not be paralyzed in our search for meaning and value in human behavior.

To appreciate the value in various religious quests in so far as they evoke awe and reverence to the perceived universe, and enable us to feel our spiritual dimension, yet recognize the unity behind the diversity in humankind's traditional religious quests.

To draw from the wisdom that carries the weight of centuries, yet yield to the revelations of science in matters ultimate pertaining to the phenomenal world.

The problems we face as a species are far more foreboding than our local quarrels, parochial pride, and historical rancor. To solve the problems of the coming century, we need to work together in peace and with understanding. We need to respect our various belief-systems, we need to help one another, and work cooperatively rather than compete with greed or envy.

Humanism Extracted from Science and Religion

Humanism is an amalgam of worldviews and values: the worldview component is drawn from whatever is reasonable, rational, and verifiable from the scientific perspective, while the value component is derived from whatever is ethical, meaningful, and fulfilling in traditional religious perspectives.

Thus, when it comes to interpreting an aspect of perceived reality in the phenomenal world, the humanist will embrace the scientific picture, not because this is the ultimate truth, but because, on the weight of all available evidence at a given moment in time, it is the most persuasive interpretation. The humanist will discard the theory of yester-century if it fails in the criteria for truth content. This springs, not from disrespect for investigators of generations now no more, but because of untenability of older views in the light of newly gathered data.

Likewise, when it comes to embracing ethical principles and adopting a moral conduct, the humanist will be inspired by the religious wisdom of the ages, enshrined in the revered texts and traditions of various religions. However, as and when these are seen to embody attitudes and injunctions which, no matter how appropriate they might have been in times past, are unacceptable in a more enlightened age, the humanist will not shy away from calling a spade a spade and dumping outworn and unconscionable views and values into the dustbin of history. Thus, for example, within the Hindu tradition, from the humanist's perspective, as also in the reckoning of enlightened leaders, both lay and religious, caste hierarchy and untouchability are to be relegated to the not-so glorious pages of our history.

The 20th century will be remembered for consciousness-raising and for its scientific/

technological breakthroughs. This century made racism a bad word and shameful practice; recognized gender oppression as social evil; proclaimed human rights as transcending race, caste, and religion; pleaded for international economic justice; condemned the exploitation of the young; began to celebrate diversity; and initiated care for the disabled. It released millions from colonial shackles, and it established world organizations in which free nations come together to solve their problems of food and health, trade and education, and resolve their political differences through discussions. All these have at their roots humanistic ideals.

Hindu vision

In this context, the Hindu vision becomes very relevant. For it reminds us that if there is splendor in the perceived world and pattern in its functioning, and if it can all result in the magnificent experiences of life and thought, then even prior to the advent of Man and Mind, there must have been an experiencing principle of enormously superior order, spanning the cosmic range in space and time. This is the cosmic substratum, this is the Brahman of the Hindu vision, the Big Bang in the poetry of current cosmology. Just as the vast expanse of water in the seas is scattered all over land in ponds and lakes and rivers and bottles, the all-embracing Brahman finds expression in countless life-forms. In this breath-taking vision we are, one and all, miniature lights from the cosmic effulgence, destined for the terrestrial experience for a brief span

on the eternal time line, only to re-merge with that from which we sprang.

This vision transcends even humanism, for it paints the human experience on a cosmic canvass. It recognizes the transience and finitude of us all as individual entities, yet incorporates us into the infinity that encompasses us. It does not rule out the possibility of other manifestations of Brahman, sublime or subtle, carbon or silicon-based, elsewhere amidst the stellar billions. It regards all religious expressions as echoes of the Universal spirit, even as volcanic outbursts here and there reveal submerged forces of far greater magnitude. The Hindu vision recognizes the role of matter, and the limits of the mind, and sees sublime spirit at the core of it all.

Some may wonder if this is not mere poetry. I say, it most certainty is: for poetry and prayer are for the human spirit what the telescope and the microscope are for human eyes. Even as the lenses enable us to discern entities beyond our normal recognition, profound poetry is a response of the spirit to that which is not fathomed through logic and reason. It brings home to us, indeed it forces us, to reckon the world of experience, not in terms of sense data and charts and proofs, but in subtle and holistic ways that reveal meaning and majesty in the universe, which lie in a realm beyond the plane of rigid rationality. At the highest levels, poetry is mysticism verbalized.

Future Visions

I began with history, and let me conclude with some reflections on the future. The course of human history is instigated by many factors, perceived and unperceived, gradual and sudden, tangible and intangible too. Thus, the rise of the Buddha, the Christ, or the Prophet Mohammed were among the major perceived factors, while the impact of certain viruses and microbes on the course of human history were never recognized as such. The impact of the Copernican-Galilean science was gradual, that of the French Revolution was sudden. The onset of the computer is a tangible factor, while that of the Human Rights concept is an intangible one.

So, when we forge visions about the Future, we can only be approximate in our assessment. And while we may be well-intentioned and enlightened in our planning, there is no telling what the future holds.

We do know that with all its stupendous scientific breakthroughs and marvelous technological achievements, the last century has also created horrendous problems, pressing and potential. A population explosion in the face of diminishing water and fuel reserves and mineral deposits, environmental pollution mobiles and industrial effluents, perilous nuclear waste depletion of rain forests: these are challenges of no mean magnitude. Then there are social and human problems, ranging from poverty and malnutrition to illiteracy and disease.

Added to all this are simmering racial, religious, and economic divides, which, if not bridged or abridged, could lead to explosions of immense proportions. In this context, we must recognize forces within many societies that accentuate the differences, and perpetuate mutual suspicion and hatred. They erupt sometimes from the narrow conviction of the superiority of one's own group or subgroup, sometimes from deep-rooted animosities engendered by centuries of oppression and historical injustices.

Thus, in the new century, though there is much to look forward to in terms of new technologies, increasing economic opportunities, interplanetary adventures, and the promise of cure for deadly diseases, we will be living in a fool's paradise if we are indifferent to the problems that the human family will be facing in the impending decades.

We cannot afford to engage in the grand illusion that there is no distinction between one group and another, that the message of every prophet is the same. We should rather nurture more effectively the notion of cultural and creedal pluralism to which the people of India are well attuned, recognizing multiplicity as intrinsic to the human condition, and looking upon races and religions as rainbow is in the heavens: colorful, and majestic, beautiful by virtue of the harmony in the hues.

Future possibilities are immense and unpredictable, for the good and for the bad: The discovery of a new and limitless non-polluting energy source could bring about a golden age of prosperity for all of humanity. The rise to power of a mindless maniac with nuclear capabilities could unleash irrevocable devastation on our species. Education and science could free all humans from ignorance and superstition, but scarce resources could deepen the divide between the haves and the have-nots. Religious and racial bigotry could fire simmering suspicions into horrendous conflagrations, or perhaps the emergence of an enlightened religious outlook would foster understanding and harmony among differing faiths. Or again, the long and checkered course of human history could be snuffed into a mere glitch in the planet's saga by the rude intrusion and blind fury of a stray asteroid lured by earth's gravity. What awaits us in time, no one can tell. Not all the factors that shape the future are within our ken or control.

In this crucial hour of India's and humanity's long history, and on the auspicious occasion of its Platinum Jubilee celebrations, the Indian Philosophical Congress could perhaps play a valuable role. According to ancient Indian tradition, philosophers do not simply speculate in ivory towers.

Now, as never before in human history, we have come to realize that we are all co-passengers in the only space-ship that is ours to share. Fortified by

the knowledge that come from the sciences, and enriched by the values and wisdom that come from traditions, we must make every effort to forget the antagonisms and animosities of the past, and strive to build a world civilization that will make this our planet a more rewarding place to be in.

The Future of the Social Sciences

Senate Holub (USA)

I. Political Philosophy as Science

Giambattista Vico (1664-1744), the author of a new science (*Scienza Nuova* 1725, 1744) at the beginning of an emerging capitalist economy in Europe's Italian region, epistemologically separated the human sciences, or the study of societies, from the natural sciences. Since god is the maker of the natural worlds, he argued, in the final analysis only god can know the laws underlying their origin and purpose. And he concluded: since human beings created the worlds of societies, the laws underlying the nature of the social worlds can be ascertained by the makers of those worlds.

But in the earliest antiquity, the world of civil society has been made by men/women, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world or nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since men/women had made it, men/women could come to know." [1]

With this reflection, Vico abandoned the study of nature. It was a strategic move for four reasons. It

allowed him, first of all to scale down his original research project, which consisted not only of a political philosophy, but also of a natural philosophy. As most leading philosophers before him, and indeed, many after him, Vico embarked on his philosophical career by connecting questions of ethics and epistemology to questions of ontology. [2] By abandoning the study of nature, he not only separated the traditioned ontological communality of both nature and culture to which the majority of his philosophical predecessors had adhered. By declaring priority and hence superiority to nature's ontological principle, he also delimited its relevance for the study of culture. Secondly, his strategic move allowed him to distance himself from his earlier work on natural philosophy, which he had pursued with specific interests in atomistic, materialist, and evolutionary theories. Thirdly, his move enabled him to participate in the process of secularization, the liberation of political authority from the tutelage of theology, that is, in the context of this process numerous intellectuals throughout the European and Mediterranean worlds wrested the exclusive access to the knowability of the course "nations" run from absolutist or despotic regimes who routinely claim their legitimacy or theocratic grounds. And finally, his strategy allowed him to promote the thesis of the knowability of history on the basis of scientific principles. What Vico advocated, then, was a methodology which, based on rational principles, was capable of assessing the past and the present of social systems. Hence it would be

capable of also predicting their future. This methodology claimed the properties of a true modem science: objectivity, universality, certainty, and predictability. Its truth resided in the facts: *verum factum convertuntur*. Just as Newton's new science of physics measured motion and rest in the mechanical worlds, Vico's new science of society measured motion and rest in the social worlds. These measurements pertained to the social facts which promote and maintain order rather than disorder in a polity. The purpose of Vico's new science, one of the founding documents of the modern social sciences, resided in the measuring of collective energies in expansion and contraction. It thus monitored social control.

No doubt, Vico was not the first thinker to reflect on social facts that pattern order and disorder. For Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the fourteenth century historian, statesman, and jurist in the tradition of the Islamic enlightenment from the Tunisian shore of the Mediterranean, studied the history of dynastic regimes since the inception of Islam. The regions he covered ranged from the Oxus to the Nile, and from the Tigris to the Guadalquivir. He detected patterns of behavior which either added to social cohesion, or participated in its disintegration. In his *Muqaddimah* (1377), he concluded that ruling groups sustain their power by a sense of solidarity, or *asabiah*, which unites both rulers and ruled. *Asabiyah*, both a structure of consciousness and a structure of feeling, which via

education and socialization assumes the power of a *habitus*, or a spontaneous common sense, obtains as long as the ruling groups refrain from attempting to gain exclusive control over all the sources of power and wealth. However, as soon as the ruling groups gain such exclusive control, conflict breaks out. The old regime will soon be displaced by a new dynastic regime. Order, followed by disorder, produces new order in Ibn Khaldun's cyclical understanding of the political histories of regions under Muslim majority control. About a century later. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Florentine republican statesman and historian, also studied the role of social facts in patterns of order and disorder.[6] Pondering on the ability of political elites in France and England to unify a territory, establish its borders, centralize its governing structure, and command it in the name of a religion. Language, culture, and nation, he arrived at the conclusion in *The Prince* (1513) that political power stabilizes with the extent of the "consensus" provided by its constituents. More precisely, he contended that since the legitimacy of political power ultimately resides in its command of a military force, those soldiers who believe in or identify with values attached to a territory, language, and culture in the form of a "myth" embody superior military capability as compared to those who are not organized around a "myth." Hence Machiavelli preferred, as Republican Romans had before him, native militias to foreign mercenaries. This consensus or a set of values, embodied by a particular symbolic system such as the

myth of the exceptionality of a nation, culture, religion, economy and language, can function as a cohesive force. In Machiavelli's estimation, its presence in Holland, France and England led to the formation of a modern nation state in the sixteenth century, while its absence in Italy prevented it. What Vico, Ibn Khaldun, and Machiavelli then have in common is their study of the social facts that condition the rise and fall of power. Yet whereas Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, as historical witnesses to the decline of their particular princes, primarily reflected on the patterns that produce anarchy, Vico, a historical witness to the rise of the centralized power of the princes in France and England, engaged in the construction of a political science for the purpose of preventing anarchy. In contradistinction to Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli, who remained anchored in the past, Vico, at the beginning of the European enlightenment, firmly anchored himself in the present. He shared his contemporaries' enthusiasm for the power of new scientific methods. Equipped with that power, he set out to discover the *res publicas* that condition not a regressive but a progressive sociality and polity.

II. Truth or Social Justice

As Vico's project suggests, what defined the social sciences since their inception in the west is their desire to seek legitimacy on the methodological grounds of the natural sciences. By doing so, they also

adopted a significant shift in the structure of scientific inquiry. When the natural sciences, at the beginning of modernity, emancipated themselves from natural philosophy by displacing a fear of or an alchemistic infatuation with nature with the desire of its domination, a dynamic interest in the instruments capable of effectively overcoming nature displaced the traditional interest of the natural philosopher in observation, classification, and alchemical experimentation. William Leiss notes: "Science and the mechanical arts (technology) replaced 'nature' as the focal point of the expectations associated with the expanding knowledge and control of natural phenomena." [2] Just as the natural sciences displaced nature with the instruments as the focal point of knowledge expansion, the social sciences too shifted the focal point of knowledge expansion from a political philosophy that reflected on the perfectibility of political society to a political science that reflected on the perfectibility of political knowledge. This shift in the structure of knowledge production was paradigmatic in many ways and has substantively impacted social and political theory to this day in innumerable ways. Its shift in emphasis from the object of inquiry (nature, culture) to perfectible mechanisms of knowledge (technology) enabled the privileging of technology and methodology, or the search for a true method, over the search for a good society. The interests in the quality of the measurements of social life thus always potentially superseded an interest in the quality of social life, and

the tensions between quantitative and qualitative social scientists reflect the implications of this epistemological move from the object of study to the instruments of the inquiring subject. Moreover, this shift from the object of inquiry to the subject as manager of these perfectible mechanisms of knowledge also produced a series of complications. Historians of science such as Carolyn Merchant have pointed to the ecological implications of this epistemological model, to the ways iii which such a model legitimated a pervasively disrespectful, if not exploitative and predatory attitude towards nature. The intellectuals' promotion of the priority of the subject over the object in knowledge acquisition, central to the modem paradigm, of course constitutes a response to the extraordinary resistance of western centers of religious power to the emancipation of the subject. Religious orthodoxy preferred a model in which the subject was capable of passively receiving the truth about society and nature by way of revelation, or by way of scripture, rather than by actively producing knowledge by its own accounts. In this context, the liberational struggle of the thinking subject of modernity, often identified with Cartesian subjectivity, is a historical product. It signals the triumph of reason over the dogmatism of conservative theology. Yet one can also point to other complications in this trajectory of the modern subject. These pertain to the extraordinary precariousness of a structure of knowledge acquisition based on the rationality of an ideal subject whose purity of consciousness has been

severed from the interested logic of body and soul, as well as from the interests of political geography and economic class. Not surprisingly, the most engaged and influential philosophical schools in the west intermittently challenged the modern subject's rational grounds from the moment it made its appearance in public in the seventeenth century. The "crisis of reason" was repeatedly declared since the inception of modernity. While the fragmentary character of the modern subject constituted the object of study of Nietzschean philosophy, Freudian psychoanalysis and linguistic nominalism, the fragmentariness of the products of such subjects in the area of knowledge constituted the object of study of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Heideggerian existentialist-phenomenological philosophy, and the philosophical schools who submitted their systems to the "linguistic turn." Throughout the twentieth century, the "crisis of reason" had not only been detected by philosophers, however, who pay attention to primary processes of knowledge production and knowledge acquisition. It had also been declared by observers of secondary processes of knowledge production, who pay attention to the organization, distribution, and exchange of knowledge. Karl Popper's *Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1957), Thomas Kuhn *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (1962), and Paul Feyerabend's *Farewell to Reason* (1987) are cases in point.

In spite of formidable challenges from the existentialist, psychoanalytic, indeterminate, and nominalist camps, the modern subject of scientific inquiry overall maintained its integral sovereignty. On the whole, the structural shift from the object of study to the subject of knowledge production, and in particular to its instruments --both conceptual. methodological, and material-- constituted a most durable feature of the western social science project, conservative and critical alike. Yet there is an additional element I would like to mention here. It pertains to tie relation of knowledge to power in the social sciences. The question of the relations of knowledge to power, or the political interestedness of knowledge, is not new, of course, for it has been central to western thought since its inception. In western philosophy, political philosophy always comprised an intrinsic moment not only of the philosophical enterprise, but also of the scientific enterprise. Indeed, science (physics), philosophy (metaphysics) and politics (ethics) not only were derived from a uniting principle but also expected to be unified in their purpose. This relation between science and politics, or the political accountability and legitimization of science, historically has been more obvious to historians and philosophers of science, rather than to historians of philosophy. More precisely, while contemporary scientists with an interest in the history and philosophy of science indicate little reluctance to addressing the connectedness between science and politics in the history of science,

contemporary philosophers interested in the history of philosophy tend to overlook this connection. The separation of philosophy from politics was a gradual process, but it intensified with the academic institutionalization of philosophy as a discipline in increasingly democratizing, and bureaucratizing, western nation states. The rise of modern aesthetic theory as an independent branch of knowledge since the eighteenth century, with its penchant for an apolitical and ahistorical conception of the world, is as much a reflection of this gradual separation of political questions from the realm of philosophy as is the intermittent call to interdisciplinary study methods in order to reunite philosophy with politics on the basis of a unifying principle. Overall, though, in the west, since the eighteenth century the social scientist increasingly replaced the political philosopher.

Here, I suggest again that it is useful to view the social sciences not only against the background of philosophy, but also against the background of the natural sciences. Yet one must also view them in their interrelations with the history of modern academic disciplines and their embeddedness in institutionalized knowledge systems of production, distribution, and reproduction. In general one can state that as the natural sciences, in the purported name of the accumulation of pure knowledge and science, legitimated their progressive disengagement from social and political questions, the social sciences found themselves caught between an always

potentially apolitical model of scientific knowledge production on the one hand, and the historical legacy of political philosophy on the other hand. That legacy reminded them of the political interestedness of all knowledge. Most significant in this historical development were the shifts in the sociological location of knowledge. Under conditions of political absolutism, the intellectual generations of political philosophers generally reflected on the relations between knowledge and power in the direct service of a prince, for the purpose of furthering dynastic interests. or in the interests of emerging productive classes, such as the bourgeoisie. Indeed, most of the important thinkers in early modernity offered their services to the needs of the bourgeoisie, a move which severely jeopardized the freedom of most. Bruno, Galileo, Descartes are good examples. The modern generations of social scientists, conservative and critical alike, since the early eighteenth century, would reflect on knowledge and power increasingly under structural conditions that are intrinsic to the modern nation state in the west. Intellectuals produced their work no longer directly at centers of political and military power, but in increasingly complex institutional and bureaucratic structures, such as at academies and universities, the rules and regulations of which, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, followed the dictates of increasing differentiation. Surely, the needs of the "nation," as perceived by the political elites of the individual nation states, imposed ideological programs that

furthered the cultural and scientific competitiveness of the leading western nations, particularly in the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth. But the inevitable differentiation into systems and subsystems of knowledge sites, of the rise of new disciplines and the disappearance of old, tendentiously complicated-- and complicates-- the relations between knowledge production and power. Karl Mannheim's notion of a free-floating intellectual, which he devised in the context of a robust sociology of knowledge, captures the empirical dilemma a theory of knowledge and power was up against by the early twentieth century. It had become unclear where precisely the knowledge organizer operated best, when it came to power, and what he/she should do. However, the institutionalization of the social scientist, in state run academies and universities, had taken its course. And to the extent to which the emerging modern universities in the west are not separable from the formation of the modern nation state and its relation to the evolution of capitalism in a colonized world system, issues pertaining to the relations of knowledge to power in the social sciences are impacted not only by the complex and differentiating disciplinary organization of the modern university, but also by their location in institutional structures the funding and management of which are not separable from the overall interests of capitalist hegemony. [11] As heirs to political philosophy, the social sciences continued the project of relating knowledge to power, particularly since the natural sciences purported to abandon and

modern philosophy, did abandon reflections of the kind. Yet simultaneously, to the extent to which the social scientists pursued their project within the constraints of discourses and disciplines which structure the modern institutions in rich mass societies, competing claims to exacting knowledge production about the relation of knowledge to power challenged knowledge production about the actual relation. This preoccupation with competing claims to exacting knowledge is best reflected in the many treatises on the sociological method which most leading sociologists felt compelled to compose at one point during their career, Weber. Durkheim, Gramsci, and the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School all addressed these claims to exacting knowledge and so did one of the more recent observers of these relations, Michel Foucault.

III. Progress and Knowledge

This replacement of the political philosopher by the social scientist, and the gradual disengagement of social science knowledge producers from the centers of political power in the west is again symbolized by Vico. In his *Scienza nuova,* he reflected on the political function of his knowledge. He distinguished the producers of social knowledge from the political group that implemented policies derived from that knowledge. "To be useful to the human race, philosophy must raise and direct weak and fallen man, not rend his nature or abandon him in his corruption,"

is one of the general principles of his new science, expressing the social function of knowledge in theological terms. Elsewhere, he abandoned the theological terminology and spoke as a social and political theorist. A social science. or political philosophy, must serve the needs of the community. [3] Hence social scientists, or intellectual elites, should offer perspectives to political elites who decide on their social and political implementation. "The wise men and princes of the commonwealth will be able, through good institutions, laws, and examples, to recall the peoples to their acme or perfect state. The practice of the science that we as philosophers can offer is such as can be completed within the academies." [4] While Vico emphasized in this passage the feasibility of the advisory role of academic intellectuals, such as himself, in the political process, he simultaneously depicted the sociological structure of his political environment: the military, the intellectuals, the politicians, and the artisans all cooperate in the maintenance of social order. In this order of governance, and decision making, the landed aristocratic class (military) depends on the cooperation of the class of intellectuals, politicians, and artisans. Since the artisans represented the economic strata whose activities were crucial for the beginning of capitalist manufacture in the Netherlands, England, France, and Germany, in Vico's Napels of about half a million residents they signaled the important strata of an emerging capitalist bourgeoisie in Italy as well. Many intellectuals, such as Vico, had their roots in

these strata. And so increasingly did the political elites. By the end of the eighteenth century, one of the most able ministers of Naples, Tanucci, was not an aristocrat, but a bourgeois. Vico's typology of the political elites, as illustrated above, is unclear about his understanding of the substantive capitalist forces of his region. He did not include the representatives of the economic elites, the capital investors, the bankers, the merchant capitalist. and the owners of factories and land of emerging industrial and agricultural capitalism. Historical research indicates that transfer of titles and land from aristocracies to non-aristocrats increased considerably in Vico's region and century. And it is also not clear from his engagement with the work of the leading European intellectuals of the emerging bourgeois cultures of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and nation state capitalism to which extent he understood the relations between the political, juridical, social, institutional, and cultural prerequisites of a rapidly expanding capitalist economy. What is clear from his dialogue with European intellectuals of his epoch is his understanding of demands of the economically productive social strata for a series of rights in the face of institutional, political. social, and cultural constraints.

As his counterparts in the Netherlands, England, France, and Germany, Vico was concerned with regulating four modern relationship of state power: (1) the relation between the individual and the

state (individual rights over group rights, eventually individual provision of education, health, and welfare), (2) the relations between individual and individual (protection of private property by the state), (3) the relations between the state and the individual (restrictions of arbitrary state power), and (4) the relations between the state and the people (sovereignty). When Vico intellectually engaged with the economic liberalism of Locke and Hume, with the imperialist international relations theory of Grotius, with the epistemological liberalism of Descartes and Leibniz, he may not have detected the impact of the powerful owners of the means of production and the controllers of the access to the rules of the trade on the making of the rules that regulate the individual's relation to the state. But he shared with the leading intellectuals of early modernity his observations of the organization of the demands for extending individual inalienable rights to increasingly larger groups of people, on the inexorability of claiming such rights on the part of non-aristocratic social strata centrally engaged in the organization of economic production and exchange. Vico was alive when England's bourgeois classes celebrated their glorious revolution in 1688, and his parents had witnessed the uprisings under Masaniello in Naples under Spanish control, the social and political causes of which are probably not separable from transfers in the colonialist world system.

When it came to social change, Vico was quite clear as to its origin and direction. Change originated from below, and not from above. As he wrote in his New Science: The task of the social scientist is not to ignore the energies that emerge from below, but to listen to the claims that arise from below, and participate in pacing the pace of that change. The extent of the usefulness of social science knowledge is linked to the service it provides for social change. For social science has its origin in society itself and finds its purpose in it, so that social science can strengthen society when it is weak, and guide it in the right direction when it makes mistakes.[16] To the extent to which people respect civil and penal codes which protect private property and the family, intellectuals should participate in the production of an ideology which grounds family and property (family law) not in religious doctrines but on the secular law of a modern polity. And the authority of the state itself could only be measured in terms of its groundedness in the sovereignty of the people. Historical progress, for Vico as for the actors in the formidable capitalist revolutions preceding him in the Netherlands and England and following him in France and Germany, was measured in terms of popular sovereignty and in terms of a juridical system based not on religion but on secular principles.

What I have argued thus far is that the rise of the social sciences in the west is not separable from the institutional, political, and economic developments

of capitalism. As sisters to the natural sciences and heirs to political philosophy, social scientists for the past three hundred years either distinguished, to various degrees, their fields of inquiry from the natural sciences and political philosophy, or identified, equally to various degrees, the goals of their fields with those of these. The epistemological, methodological, and political tensions that obtained between the sciences and ethics by the twentieth century acquired the name of the "two cultures." [5] As the natural sciences increasingly became disinterested in the social consequences of scientific research and application, the social sciences intermittently pointed to the social consequences of socially disinterested scientific practice. This is to say, although the social sciences since their inception experienced considerable pressure to abandon social, and more particularly, democratic concerns in the name of objectivity, universality, and the neutrality of science, on the whole major social scientists did not give up the notion of the social accountability and responsibility of the social scientist. The terms of the enlightenment, progress, democracy, and human rights patiently courted the sociological imagination. When Karl Marx about one hundred years after Vico's death pronounced his famous Feuerbach Thesis No 11, history in the form of the French Revolution had suggested to him that active seizures of political state power were not simply contingent on emancipatory social theories. "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to

change it," wrote Marx, thereby pointing to the secondary function theory fulfilled in his understanding of the dialectical struggle towards authentic democratic freedom for all. [6] However secondary theory's function in the Marxist framework of history's inexorable march towards revolutionary freedom, a function it still fulfilled. In fact, Marx's entire life project focused on the socio-economic analysis of capitalism, on detecting the systemic connections and systematic linkages between the productivity of the producers of commodities on the one hand, and the managers of productivity and unproductivity on the other hand. It also demystified the fetishism of the intellectual class that produced knowledge about these processes, the political economists. The ideological alliances between producers of social knowledge and the controllers of the access to the management of the organization of social wealth and poverty, which Marx poignantly criticized, should become important arguments in critical social and political theories throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After Marx, an entire range of social theorists revendicated the claim of the social accountability of knowledge. Antonio Gramsci, for one, with his theory of intellectuals, as expounded in *The Southern Question* (1926) and *The Prison Notebooks* (1929-35) reflected on the function of the managers of social justice in the context of the organization of the working class struggle in Italy. And the Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, for another, always attempted, even by way of their most

esoteric representatives, such as Theodore Adorno, to forge the relations between capitalist power and resisting knowledge. Similarly, feminist critical theorists since the 1970's throughout the United States and western Europe, poignantly called into question the links between the epistemological assumptions of predominant social science and forms of patriarchal oppression.

IV. South and North

Yet in spite of the self-reflexivity that characterized important critical tendencies in western social science, one thing is certain. Social matters and concerns were not global but mostly regional if not local in nature. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to point to the regionalist and parochialist dimensions of western mainstream social science. The significant analytical concepts that emerged within its context predominantly measured not a general but a particular social reality: that of western society. inscribed into concepts, methods, and epistemologies was Europe's presumed historical significance vis-a-vis the rest of the global regions, as Immanuel Wallerstein notes in his *The End of the World as We Know It. Social Science for the Twenty-First Century.* Concepts, methods, and epistemologies were deemed universalizable. As bi-products of the trajectory of the market economies of industrial capitalism, the cultures of western science and philosophy, however contentious the struggle of its "two cultures," from the

start were based on the premise of the insignificance of knowledge production outside the western purview. Here, by way of example, let me return one more time to Vico. In his *Autobiography* (1729) he representatively mentioned that it was surely no coincidence that he, Vico, had been born in Naples, and not in Morocco. It was no coincidence, he states, that a new science of the nature of nations issued forth in an Italian city, for its purpose resided in adding to the glory of Italy, and not to that of any other place. Hence, the emergence of his new science was tied to a specific place at a specific time. And indeed, Vico's science originated at a particular historical moment, a moment marked by the consequences of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. With this treaty, powerful European kings publicly tolerated the right of each nation to select a state religion of their choice. Yet the sovereignty which they ascribed to their own territories did not extent to Germany and Italy. With this treaty, they privately insisted on the right of their own unified nation states (Sweden, Austria, France, England and Russia) to maintain the balance of power in Europe by fighting their respective wars on the non-unified territories of Germany and Italy. The domination of Italian territories in particular occasioned an endless tug of war of Europe's centers of power until Italy's unification in the 1870's. Vico, born sixteen years after the Peace of Westphalia, and resident of a city that had at the time of his birth experienced uninterrupted foreign rule for hundreds of years, had reason to ponder the substantive conditions

of national unity. That his new science dispensed policies for the formation of a sovereign and independent Italian nation state was surely the understanding of many eighteenth century Italian patriotic intellectuals who had read his work. Yet even if that patriotic detail were debatable, one thing is certain. Vico, as practically all western mainstream social scientists has an intellectual and spiritual predilection for western cultural regions exclusively, a predilection which contemporary critics have conceptualized as "eurocentricity." It is a penchant he indeed shared with many leading figures of the western social science tradition, ranging from Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Gramsci, to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the feminist theorists. For instance, Vico initially engaged in a comparative study of the originary social facts (religion, burial rights, marriage) that produce political cohesion. In his comparative approach, he focused on the history of many societies, such as those of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phoenicians, Scythians, Jews, Greeks and Romans. Yet he abandoned his multi-cultural design when he narrowed his approach to the exclusive study of Greece and Rome. [7]

Ultimately, although he makes claims to the universality of his science of the nature of nations, his *Scienza nuova* used overwhelming empirical evidence from Greek epic poetry, and, above all, from the history of Roman Republican law. Hence Greek and Roman history normalize the entire Mediterranean

region in his conception of the world. In this he foreshadowed, in the early eighteenth century, the predilections of the European intellectual elites of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century for Greek and Roman antiquity.

Marx, similarly, who surely understood that the law of capitalism entailed an inexorable need, on the one hand, for new markets of cheap labor and goods, and, on the other hand, for the control of access to natural resources, consequently took into account capitalism's necessity to pursue colonialist and imperialist strategies in order to maintain a competitive edge. His pages on India and Algeria reflect a geographic sensibility of sorts. Ultimately, though, he measured the evolution of capitalism in non-western regions along conceptual lines directly derived from his analysis of capitalist industrial formations in England. Weber and Durkheim, who both worked on sociologies of religions, engaged in detailed studies of ethnographic materials and religious documents not only from Europe, but from many global regions. In one of his most substantive volumes, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), Durkheim focused on the totemic systems of Australian tribes. [8] Weber's most central focus of thought lay in a comparative sociology of religion, in the context of which he studied the religions of India, China, the west (Protestantism), Islam, and Judaism. Hence, both of their geographic imaginations extended far beyond the European borders. However, it is

important to note that for both of these "fathers of western sociology," the study of Asia Pacific for one, (Durkheim), or of India and of China, for another (Weber) was ultimately in the interest of more differentiated knowledge production about the past and the future of western societies, and not in the interest of knowledge production about the rest of the world. When the rest of the world figures, it figured along the measurements and norms of western industry, technology, and culture. And more significantly, as French and German critical sociology increasingly operated under conditions of competitive nationalism in the century of the two world wars, on the whole they closed their shops to African, Latin American, and Asian Studies. The Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, however universalizing their methodologies and conceptualities, primarily dealt with issues pertaining to European history, such as the impact of moral disasters -- World War Two and the holocaust --on modernity's claim to progress. Or they dealt with issues pertaining to modern society under conditions of advanced capitalism -- consumer society, mass culture, one-dimensionalization of modern psychic structure, instrumental reason, and the like.

French social science, while more astute to institutional life outside European regions due to its colonialist history, in its significant forays into structural anthropology it nonetheless adhered to notions of the "primitive" and the "modern," when purveying social life outside Europe. At times, the

"primitive" is elevated to challenging the "modern," such as in Freud's notion of a civilizational discontent. Yet Freud's cultural geography of the soul remains thoroughly European. Even Gramsci, who had more of a sense of the global immanence of anti-colonial movements, adhered to normative principles of industrial productivity unmistakingly rooted in the history of the Western economic systems of industrial capitalism. On the whole, none of the major representatives of western critical social science had traveled much outside Europe and the U.S. Weber had made a trip to the United States, Durkheim had traveled to Germany, and Marx moved between Germany, France, Holland, and England, which represented, apart from the U.S., the core countries of global capitalism. His brief visit to Algeria, late in his life and for reasons of health, had not much impact, if any, on the structure of his theory. Gramsci visited the Soviet Union in the early 1920's, and members of the Frankfurt School spent years of political exile in the U.S. during and after World War Two. Few, if any, had first hand knowledge of the regions beyond Europe and the U.S. There existed profound limits to their geographic imagination. When the U.S., after World War Two, reiterated its exclusive global hegemonic hold on the access to the writing of the rules of global trade -- an hegemony that should last from 1918 to 1989, interests in the rest of the world on the part of the European social scientists diminished even further in favor of regionalized, if not localized intellectual engagements. Indeed, until 1989, much of

the energies of the significant players of the social science establishment concentrated on definitions of "modernity," a concept not in a plural but in a singular case, which is designed to grasp and clarify not any modernity but the condition of "modernity" in the social-democracies of western European late capitalism. Giddens, Touraine, Habermas, and Bobbio all responded to that competitive call for clarification.[28] On the whole, western social scientists, whether conservative, liberal, or critical alike, remained resilient to engaging in an understanding of the function of the self-imposed geographic constraints of their knowledge production in geopolitics. Hence the struggle of the so-called "two cultures" in the west between the socially disinterested natural sciences and the socially interested wing of the social sciences was ultimately a struggle impervious to its exclusive rootedness in the west in terms of its origins, purposes, and goals. As such, it was profoundly disinterested in the point of view, epistemological and ethical, of the "third cultures," those of the third world or the south.

That the predominant conception of the world of mainstream western social science remained eurocentric is a function of many variables and it is not the place here to examine it. Suffice it to say that the educational socialization of western intelligentsias in general, but of the European in particular, is closely linked, over the past hundreds of years, to the formation of the modern state, which is also a national state. To the extent to which the nation state was a

necessary institution for the development of industrial capitalism, the class of industrial capitalists insisted on the production of elites, political and intellectual, who functioned as the producers, distributors, and maintenance operators of their respective national cultures. These in turn supported the state and the state supported economic system. The survival needs of the modern political economy extended into the sphere of education and culture. For one, a class based economic production and market system required the systematic production of various strata of citizens, whose variability in skill and life quality expectation was crucial for the maintenance of this class based economy. Extensively stratified systems of education answered to these needs. Since class differences do not lend themselves to social cohesion, political elites resorted to the aid of intellectual elites in order to systematically assuage the differences in status and welfare. Mythologies of origin, commonality, and purpose constructed national cultures, and every generation in Europe was simultaneously raised, via the administratively centralized and socially differential educational system, to national identity and to class consciousness. For the elites of Europe's economic core countries, the experience of class and nation unambiguously coincided into one. The fact of the economic superiority of class minimized the need for national identity, while economic and social inferiority maximizes it. The production of national identity on the basis of geographic studies, architecture, literature, history, music, and art is the

sine qua non of the European educational system. Europe's most powerful national cultures, as functions of their respective political economies, competed with each other for generations, in terms of the influence they wished to exert on Europe's periphery. But that competition also principally involved the access to and control of the legacy of western antiquity. The obsession with that legacy has produced extraordinarily extensive traditions of scholarship, particularly in the nineteenth century. But it has also produced, as Edward Said pointed out, a tradition of scholarship which measures an underdeveloped "orient" along the lines of an industrialized, technologized, democratized and wealthy "occident" without taking into account the relation between "oriental" underdevelopment and "occidental" industrialization. The social sciences in the west, raised in the disciplines and institutions of a complex educational and cultural system in Europe the existence of which stretches back in some instances to about 500 years of bourgeois hegemonic history, were profoundly socialized into the cultural consciousness of Europe's nations. This past cannot be undone. But a future in the social sciences can be shaped.

V. Social Science in the Network Age

The economic, military, and cultural hegemony of the United States during the cold war period exercised considerable influence on the scientific cultures of Europe. The social science cultures were

no exception. The structure of the field of U.S. political science, for instance, grounded in a philosophical model of political realism, was introduced to a variety of European academies, particularly in Italy. [9] European social scientists, while competing with each other for authority and status, were also always engaged with the methods and goals of the "hard wing" of the U.S. social sciences, with economics, political science, and sociology, that is. While British and German social scientists engaged more directly with U.S. social science as compared to the French, the French social scientists in turn competed with the Germans and the British over intellectual territory in Italy, Spain, and other intellectual regions. This competition for intellectual hegemony extended to other global regions as well, and Brazil's systematic recourse to French intellectuals in the thirties to build its social science fields -- and to German chemists in order to build their natural sciences, is one of many formidable reminders of the geopolitical facts of academic geography. During the cold war, intrinsic to the dominant U.S. social science project, particularly in sociology and political science, was its tendency to exclusively explore the workings of U.S. society. As a result, the U.S. government, aware of its potentially systemic lack of experts on global regions, encouraged the organization of "Area Studies" at research universities in order to meet its need for international knowledge. More recently, the European Union has copied this model of "Area Studies" in its cultural diplomacy

strategy by funding a series of European Studies Programs in the Asia Pacific, South East Asia, the Southern Mediterranean (Cairo, Egypt), and in South Asia (Delhi, India). As European social science continued its dialogue with U.S. counterparts, they witnessed the challenges to predominant social science in the U.S. by a series of powerful social movements, such as the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the multicultural rights movement. These have begun to transform the structure of some disciplines, the organization of some divisions in the academy, and hence of the organization of some branches of knowledge production in the U.S. These transformations have been most notably in the area of the humanities and cultural studies, divisions of limited institutional and social influence, prestige, and power, to be sure, but the extent of the effects of the social movements of the sixties and seventies on the structures of thinking and feeling on U.S. political and intellectual elites has not been adequately studied. As European social science, faced with its own social transformations due to international migration flows, began to profit from multicultural knowledge derived from the U.S., both European and U.S. social science, especially in its "hard wing," in economics, political science, and sociology, nonetheless remained anchored in a political philosophy of distributive justice that excludes non-US and non-European territories from its distribution of economic justice. The multicultural debates in the U.S. of the eighties, for instance, rarely included systematic discussions on

economic cultures that live outside U.S. terrain. The power of the predominant international relations paradigm thus overshadowed the project of critique in the western social sciences.

Perhaps not paradoxically at all -- given the mixture of international talent and first rate indigenous advanced intellectual production that accrues to the U.S. academies, the most powerful institutions of higher education worldwide -- the most significant epistemological transformations in the western social sciences have emerged not from Europe, but from the U.S. These have been nurtured particularly by the "soft wing" of US social science. These pertain to cultural anthropology and economic geography, on the one hand, and to studies in interdisciplinary fields that have mostly lived on the periphery of the U.S. academy for many decades, on the other hand. Development Studies, Peace Studies, Ecology Studies etc are cases in point. In spite of its entrenched bureaucracies, the U.S. academy has historically demonstrated greater flexibility in terms of disciplinary innovation as compared to European universities. While the "soft wing" of the U.S. social sciences, including some of the newly emerging interdisciplinary studies fields, systematically engaged with conceptions of the world that called into question the geopolitical functions of hegemonic western epistemologies and economic ethics, leading interdisciplinary social scientists have recently endeavored to relate the enabling features of the

structural changes of western economic society to the rest of the world. The move towards radical self-reflexivity in the western "soft" social sciences, furthered, particularly in the U.S., by profound epistemological shifts derived from the feminisms of the past few decades and the discourses on the nexus between race, gender, and class coincide with a series of significant epistemological developments and shifts on a global scale. What is significant about this coincidence is not the fact of its existence, but the fact of its existence in the context of the constraints and possibilities of the network age. For lack of a better term, I will call this historical possibility of these newly emerging conceptualities in the social sciences the rise of the "fourth culture." Thereby I wish to distinguish it from the historical notion of the "two cultures," as explored above, on the one hand, and to signal the inevitable countdown of the peripheral status of the knowledge cultures and centers of knowledge production of the third world, on the other hand. Particularly since 1989, the rise of this fourth culture has increasingly assumed recognizable forms the functions of which have already been measured -- however exploratorily-- in a series of empirical studies.[10] The informing elements of this emerging fourth social science culture are many and their respective value and function in its construction must be subject to empirical verification. It can not be done in the context of this essay. I can only briefly address three of its many informing elements in the remainder of this essay. These pertain to (1) the continuity in the

critical epistemological traditions of organic intellectuals of the south; (2) the effects of the dialogue between northern and southern intellectuals on the issue of religion and secularism; and (3) the possibilities of the internet and other new means of communication in bridging information and knowledge gaps between north and south while simultaneously increasing communication and consorted action between anti-consumerist cultural movements in the north and all manner of democratic impulses in the south. By democratic I understand the desire of groups and communities to organize their control over the forces that shape their lives.

(1) First, with the advent of the major independence movements of the former colonies since the end of World War Two, organic intellectuals from developing countries have elaborated -- against the pressures of elites at home and abroad who subscribe to the model of western modernity -- critical traditions which problematize the claims of universality inscribed in western social science. Among these critical intellectuals are Frantz Fanon, Paolo Freire, Samir Amin, Ashis Nandy, Aziz al-Azmeh, Amartya Sen, Vandana Shiva and many others. Whether one agrees with their point of view or not, their work is rooted in a consciousness that reflects the difference of their social realities from those of the institutional trajectory of western society. Since these intellectuals have called for the scientific study of their realities for the economic, social, and political benefit of their

society, they all have, on their own terms, addressed the issue of cultural difference. Against the background of these models of cultural differentiation, new generations of social scientists can and have more effectively explored the institutional difficulties developing countries experience as part of a globalized, networked, and informational world system. In other words, for over fifty years third world intellectuals and first world intellectuals who have, as much as that is possible, tried to understand the Third World's point of view, have patiently assembled elements for a social science that is relevant to the actual development of their society and region. A recent publication entitled "Thai Studies," in which a series of social scientists examine Thai society from a historiographical, anthropological, and cultural perspective, is a good example. [11]

(2) The second element is intrinsically linked to the rise of religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world, developing and developed alike. In the developing world or the south, particularly in regions of Muslim majority countries, attempts at forging a social science, and hence potentially' social policies that combine traditional religious doctrines with the needs of nations in a network of global shifts and transformations have produced a series of effects. Many of them are not positive from the point of view of human rights, democratic institutions, and enlightened legacies. What is important here is that the rise of religious fundamentalism in Muslim majority

countries, known by the name of Islamism, has also had an impact on Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, who since the early nineties have increasingly made organized claims to specific cultural rights. These include the right to symbolic materiality, such as the building of mosques, cemeteries, and the funding of the training of clergy. As a result, leading public intellectuals in the west have met this challenge by taking recourse to western philosophical traditions, which, equipped with the concepts of human rights, equality, democracy, progress, and freedom, adhere to the tradition of secularism. Thereby they tend to bypass the problematic of religion. Yet for critical Afro-Asian intellectuals who live and work in cultures and societies that experience the political impact of religious doctrines if not orthodoxy and dogmatism, bypassing religion is not an easily available option. Thus one of the unintended consequences of religious fundamentalism has been the recognized need for a systematic dialogue between southern and northern intellectuals, particularly on the issue of religion, ideology, and culture. For the past twenty years, intellectuals such as Mona Abousenna and Mourad Wahba (Cairo, Egypt) have indefatigably fostered discussion on the clashes between western political philosophies and religious fundamentalism. Similarly, Ashis Nandy has worked for many decades from within his Institute for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, India to engage northern intellectuals with southern realities. By necessity, dialogues that obtain cannot circumvent the haunting

effects of colonialism long after its abolishment, the continuing disenfranchisement of Third World countries from wresting the dictate of the rules of their trade from outsiders, and on the inexorable logic of an economic system, such as capitalism, that ever more pits a democratic ethics of equal opportunity against the geopolitical reality of profoundly unequal life chances. Most importantly, the struggle to diminish global inequality has turned into a struggle between moral authorities whose variable recourse to religious symbols in the production and management of a national consciousness reflects the difficulty, or perhaps the impossibility, of producing a modern, secular, enfranchised, and literate society within a few decades.

(3) Thirdly, the information technology revolution, which drives a networked and globalized economy as it is driven by it has begun to operate a fundamental hegemonic shift not yet significantly in knowledge production, but in knowledge acquisition and knowledge application. Access to the web, as observers of globalization point out, connects capital flows, investments, and currency speculation for those who command capital, investments, and currencies. But access to the web also connects flows of knowledge, information, and advise throughout the world potentially capable of participating in the charting of more equitable and sustainable futures for generations to come. As anti-consumerist organizations on a global scale link up with political

groups, social movements, cultural institutions and all manner of organized practices designed to oppose old and new forms of exploitation of the third world on a global scale, an enabling element of the fourth culture arises. It is a condition of a possibility of upholding of what Gramsci called the "good sense." In all regions of the world, be it in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, organic intellectuals participate in pacing the pace of the practices of "good sense." These consist in wresting, via experience and reflection, the natural law of "common sense," and turn it into the natural law of "good sense," a sense that spontaneously, on the level of thinking and feeling, abandons the moral law and order of inequality. Yet the condition of possibility of a fourth culture in the social sciences is not simply dependent on the continued work of organic intellectuals of the south to remind us, intellectuals of the north, of the contingencies of location and history when crafting democratic transformations. Indeed, as the globalization debates bring home, there is no unified global theory of progress. The most promising conditions of possibility of the fourth culture resides in the fact of unprecedented means of communication in the emerging network age. The fourth culture in the social sciences both enables and is the product of these new conditions of communicability. Its promise, in the midst of the globalization of cultures and the cultures of globalization, is irrevocable.

Endnotes

[1] *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*. Trs. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1984. P. 96 Axiom 331.

[2] In his *De antiquissima italorum sapientiae*, on the "Most Ancient Wisdoms of the Italians," published in 1710, (Vico, Opere Filosofiche, ed. Nicola Badaloni, Florence: Sansoni, 1971. pp. 57-168) Vico promoted the search of a foundational principle capable of uniting all the sciences. This treatise, often referred to as Vico's *Liber metaphysicus*, announces the structure of three proposed books: on metaphysics, on physics, and on moral philosophy or ethics respectively. From the order of this program it is clear that metaphysics, or an ontology, would precede in importance his study of nature on the one hand, and his study of society on the other hand.

[2] See his *Domination of Nature*: "Science and the mechanical arts (technology) replaced 'nature' as the focal point of the expectations associated with the expanding knowledge and control of natural phenomena. (New York: George Braziller. 1972) p. 76.

[3] See The edition of the *Scienza nuova* of 1725, fifth book. p. 305 in *Vico, Opere Filosofiche*, ed. Nicola

Badaloni, (Florence: Sansoni, 1971) and the 'Practice of the New Science' in *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, p. 427.

[4] Ibid, p. 427.

[5] *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, p. 305.

[6] The Marx-Engels Reader. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. (New York and London: Norton Publisher, 1978), p. 145.

[7] Actually, as it turns out, although he includes Hebrew civilization in his tables, he will not submit it to comparative study, as Martin Bernal has pointedly noted: Black Athena. *The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, 2 Vols. (New Brunswick. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1987), vol. 1, p. 170.

[8] Emile Durkheim. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Tr. and Intro by Karen E. Fields. New York and London: The Free Press, 1995. Original edn Paris: E. Alcan, 1912.

[9] In *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey*. Eds. David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Luigi Graziano. Routledge: London and New York, 1991. pp. 13-34.

[10] Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. Eds. *The Cultures of Globalization*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998. Frank Lechner and John Boll. Eds. *The Globalization Reader*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2000. John Tomlinson. *Globalization and Culture*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. For a contending view see: Peter Gowan. *The Global Gamble*. Washington's *Faustian Bid for World Dominance*. London and New York: Verso. 1999.

[11] *The State of Thai Stitches: A Critical Survey*. Eds. Chatthip Nartsupha, Surichai Wun'Gaeo, Chaiyan Rajchagool, Kanya Leelalai, Siripom Yodkamonsat. Bangkok: The Thailand Research Fund, 1997.